ENS 52414
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
19:43 Dec 7, 2016 | |
| Title | Discovery of Non-Conforming Conditions During Tornado Hazards Analysis |
| Event Description | During the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment, it was concluded that the following SSCs [systems, structures, and components] were vulnerable to tornado generated missiles.
The Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) intake and exhaust ventilation hoods, located on the roof of the SWIS, are not adequately protected from missiles generated by a tornado. Should a tornado-generated missile strike the SWIS intake and exhaust ventilation hoods, the hoods could crimp thus reducing air flow and challenging the performance of their heating and cooling safety functions. If the intake hoods were damaged or removed due to a missile strike, entry of rainwater could occur due to severe weather high wind velocity, and could affect safety related electrical equipment in the rooms directly below the hoods. These potential conditions could render Service Water trains inoperable on either or both units. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). Required actions have been taken. Corrective actions will be documented in a follow up licensee event report. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. The licensee is evaluating the operability of the service water system. Should one train be declared inoperable, the licensee would be in a 72 hr. LCO action statement. If both trains are inoperable, then the licensee would enter T.S. 3.0.3. |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Farley  Alabama (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-2.32 h-0.0967 days <br />-0.0138 weeks <br />-0.00318 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Chuck Barefield 17:24 Dec 7, 2016 |
| NRC Officer: | Howie Crouch |
| Last Updated: | Dec 7, 2016 |
| 52414 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Farley with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 533922018-05-08T04:00:0008 May 2018 04:00:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition ENS 531592018-01-09T23:59:0009 January 2018 23:59:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition Identified During National Fire Protection Association 805 Implementation ENS 524142016-12-07T19:43:0007 December 2016 19:43:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Discovery of Non-Conforming Conditions During Tornado Hazards Analysis ENS 496382013-12-16T22:27:00016 December 2013 22:27:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition Due to Unfused Direct Current Ammeter Circuits ENS 458122010-04-04T17:45:0004 April 2010 17:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Both Trains of Residual Heat Removal (Rhr) Inoperable ENS 456732010-02-03T02:15:0003 February 2010 02:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Two of Three Trains of Auxiliary Feed Water Declared Inoperable ENS 443582008-07-22T01:58:00022 July 2008 01:58:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Loss of Accident Mitigation Capabilities Due to Two Emergency Diesel Generators Out of Service 2018-05-08T04:00:00 | |