ENS 44358
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
01:58 Jul 22, 2008 | |
| Title | Loss of Accident Mitigation Capabilities Due to Two Emergency Diesel Generators Out of Service |
| Event Description | On 7/20/08 at 1757, the 1B Emergency Diesel generator was voluntarily removed from service for a planned exhaust header replacement. The 1B Emergency Diesel remains out of service and is anticipated to be returned to service on 7/26/08.
On 7/21/08 at 2058, the 1-2A Emergency Diesel generator was declared inoperable due to excessive amounts of water present in the diesel lube oil system. The combination of these two diesels being out of service results in two emergency diesels, one in each train, being inoperable for Farley Unit One. This represents a Unit One loss of safety function for mitigating the consequences of an accident in the event of a loss of off-site power. Farley Unit Two is affected only by the 1-2A Emergency Diesel and is maintaining a B-Train Emergency Diesel operable. The 1-2A Emergency Diesel is suspected of having a lube oil heat exchanger tube leak. Confirmation of the tube leak and repairs are anticipated to take three to four days. The loss of two EDGs places Unit One in an 8-hr plant shutdown action statement which will require the unit to initiate shutdown by 0458 CDT on July 22, 2008 and be in hot standby by 1058 CDT. Unit Two is in a 10-day non-shutdown action statement as a result of the loss of the 1-2A Emergency Diesel Generator. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On 7/20/08 at 1757, the 1 B Emergency Diesel Generator was voluntarily removed from service for a planned exhaust header replacement. On 7/21/08 at 2058, the 1-2A emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.8.1 due to excessive amounts of water present in the diesel lube oil system. The combination of both diesels out of service required entry into Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition E. With both an 'A' train and a 'B' train Emergency Diesel Generators inoperable, a loss of safety function exists. A technical specification required shutdown from Mode 1 to Mode 3 was commenced at 0541 CST in accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition F. Unit 1 is required to be in Mode 3 prior to 1058 CST. Unit 2 is affected by the 1-2A Emergency Diesel Generator being removed from service. However, there is no loss of safety function on Unit 2 because the B train Emergency Diesel Generator is operable. Unit 2 remains in Mode 1, 100% power. Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey) |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Farley  Alabama (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | |
| LER: | 05000348/LER-2008-003 |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+2.2 h0.0917 days <br />0.0131 weeks <br />0.00301 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Jim Hunter 04:10 Jul 22, 2008 |
| NRC Officer: | Howie Crouch |
| Last Updated: | Jul 22, 2008 |
| 44358 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Farley with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 524142016-12-07T19:43:0007 December 2016 19:43:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Discovery of Non-Conforming Conditions During Tornado Hazards Analysis ENS 523742016-11-18T00:59:00018 November 2016 00:59:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Technical Specification Required Shutdown Initiated ENS 510472015-05-07T10:09:0007 May 2015 10:09:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Technical Specification Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pump Trip ENS 497152014-01-11T17:00:00011 January 2014 17:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications ENS 481402012-07-27T02:51:00027 July 2012 02:51:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Tech Spec Required Shutdown for Diesel Maintenance Exceeding Allowed Outage Time ENS 461752010-08-15T05:45:00015 August 2010 05:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Ts Required Shutdown Entered Due to High Containment Temperature ENS 458122010-04-04T17:45:0004 April 2010 17:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Both Trains of Residual Heat Removal (Rhr) Inoperable ENS 456732010-02-03T02:15:0003 February 2010 02:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Two of Three Trains of Auxiliary Feed Water Declared Inoperable ENS 443582008-07-22T01:58:00022 July 2008 01:58:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Loss of Accident Mitigation Capabilities Due to Two Emergency Diesel Generators Out of Service ENS 426742006-06-30T13:19:00030 June 2006 13:19:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Main Steam Isolation Valve Stuck During Testing 2016-12-07T19:43:00 | |