ENS 52329
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
13:40 Oct 28, 2016 | |
| Title | Unanalyzed Condition Due to Fire Barrier/Helb Door Inoperable |
| Event Description | The licensee reported an unanalyzed condition under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) due to a fire barrier/HELB (high energy line break) door being inoperable during maintenance. This resulted in two of five safe shutdown panels to be declared inoperable.
The door, located between the Turbine and Administrative Buildings, was opened for approximately two minutes for 'tool pouch work'. When Operations discovered the door was opened for maintenance, they declared the door inoperable until Operations performed the surveillance required to declare the door operable. The total time the door was inoperable was approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 11 minutes. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The condition reported in ENS 52329 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) has been evaluated, and determined not to be an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2001-09, 'Control of Hazard Barriers,' allows breaching of HELB barriers, provided the risk associated with the applicable maintenance activity is assessed and managed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule. The hazard barrier controls procedure at JAF [James A. Fitzpatrick] is consistent with this guidance, and includes compensatory measures for opening of the subject HELB door (76FDR-A-272-26). Per the JAF hazard barrier controls procedure the secondary HELB doors are to be verified operable, and the Alternate Shutdown Panels 25ASP-4 and 25ASP-5 declared inoperable. Based on a review of previous performances of ST-76Y, Fire Door Inspection and Operability Test, and the JAF Paperless Condition Reporting System, all applicable secondary HELB doors were operable prior to and during the 'tool pouch work' on 76FDR-A-272-26. JAF TS LCO 3.3.3.2, Remote Shutdown System (RSS), stipulates a completion time of thirty days to restore one or more required remote shutdown functions to operable. The duration of the 'tool pouch work' and inoperability of 76FDR-A-272-26 is well within this thirty day allowed outage time. In addition, the Alternate Shutdown Panels that were rendered inoperable by this condition are not required for mitigation of a HELB, and steam line break accidents are not discussed in the Technical Specification (TS) Bases for the Remote Shutdown System. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Lilliendahl). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Fitzpatrick  New York (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+3.93 h0.164 days <br />0.0234 weeks <br />0.00538 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | David Arcelus 17:36 Oct 28, 2016 |
| NRC Officer: | Howie Crouch |
| Last Updated: | Dec 27, 2016 |
| 52329 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (72 %) |
| After | Power Operation (72 %) |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 554272021-08-24T18:06:00024 August 2021 18:06:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Appendix R Hot Short Unanalyzed Condition ENS 545332020-02-20T17:40:00020 February 2020 17:40:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition - Unprotected Dc Control Circuits ENS 541302019-06-24T22:15:00024 June 2019 22:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition En Revision Imported Date 10/1/2019 ENS 523292016-10-28T13:40:00028 October 2016 13:40:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition Due to Fire Barrier/Helb Door Inoperable ENS 494912013-10-31T21:22:00031 October 2013 21:22:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Postulated Fire Event Could Result in a Hot Short That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment 2021-08-24T18:06:00 | |