ENS 50778
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
00:57 Jan 29, 2015 | |
| Title | Safety System Will Not Function as Required |
| Event Description | At 1957 EST on 01/28/2015, with the unit in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, it was discovered that a modification installed during the fall 2013 refueling outage at H. B. Robinson inadvertently cross connected both trains of reactor protection. This cross connection resulted in both trains of safety injection being required to actuate in order to produce a reactor protection reactor trip. This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) since it was determined that an automatic safety system does not function as required.
The cross connection of the reactor protection trains presented an unanalyzed condition and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). An additional unanalyzed condition was identified in which the 'A' and 'B' DC Train systems were cross connected by the same condition and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This condition is also being reported as an eight hour non-emergency under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) condition that could prevent fulfillment of safety functions. At no time during this occurrence was the public or plant staff at risk as a result of this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This condition did place the unit in Technical Specification 3.0.3 for the reactor protection system and the DC vital buses, but the condition causing the issue was cleared at 2048 EST prior to any lowering of reactor power. The licensee will be notifying appropriate State, local and other government agencies as required. |
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Robinson South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| Other Unspec Reqmnt 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-4.03 h-0.168 days <br />-0.024 weeks <br />-0.00552 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Nick Roh 20:55 Jan 28, 2015 |
| NRC Officer: | Jeff Rotton |
| Last Updated: | Jan 28, 2015 |
| 50778 - NRC Website
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Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Robinson | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 521742016-08-11T19:05:00011 August 2016 19:05:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Robinson Dam Tainter Gates Unanalyzed Condition ENS 518642016-04-13T18:30:00013 April 2016 18:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition ENS 507782015-01-29T00:57:00029 January 2015 00:57:00 Other Unspec Reqmnt, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Safety System Will Not Function as Required ENS 477482012-03-16T08:00:00016 March 2012 08:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Refueling Water Storage Tank Connected to an Unqualified System ENS 480112011-05-04T17:25:0004 May 2011 17:25:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Refueling Water Storage Tank Connected to Non-Seismically Qualified System ENS 463172010-10-07T17:15:0007 October 2010 17:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Feedwater Isolation Inadvertently Disabled ENS 460452010-06-24T18:34:00024 June 2010 18:34:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Instrument Buses 3 and 8 Failed Causing Closure of Rhr Valves ENS 406172004-03-28T15:26:00028 March 2004 15:26:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Both Trains of High Pressure Safety Injection Inoperable for 25 Minutes 2016-08-11T19:05:00 | |