ENS 48011
ENS Event | |
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17:25 May 4, 2011 | |
Title | Refueling Water Storage Tank Connected to Non-Seismically Qualified System |
Event Description | On May 4, 2011, at approximately 1325 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, in Mode 1 at 100% power, it was determined that over the last 40 years, HBRSEP, Unit No. 2 periodically performed cleanup of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) by aligning the non-seismically qualified refueling water purification system to the safety related and seismically qualified RWST without recognizing that the action rendered the RWST inoperable. As a result, on multiple occasions, the RWST was inoperable for a period longer than allowed by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation 3.5.4, Emergency Core Cooling Systems Refueling Water Storage Tank.
'The cause of this event was that regulatory requirements for the separation of seismically qualified and non-qualified systems, structures, and components were not adequately incorporated into the Design Basis Document (DBD) and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). A clearance order has been placed in effect to ensure restrictions for piping that could affect the operability of the RWST remain in place. This event was described in Licensee Event Report 2011-001-00 and was initially reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. However, further reviews determined at 0800 on June 11, 2012, that the event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. During the three year period prior to May 4, 2011, it is estimated that the purification loop was in service aligned to the RWST while on-line nine times, totaling 297 days. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
Where | |
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Robinson South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+9688.63 h403.693 days <br />57.67 weeks <br />13.271 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Rich Rogalski 10:03 Jun 11, 2012 |
NRC Officer: | Dong Park |
Last Updated: | Jun 11, 2012 |
48011 - NRC Website
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Unit 2 | |
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Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Robinson with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 507782015-01-29T00:57:00029 January 2015 00:57:00
[Table view]Other Unspec Reqmnt, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Safety System Will Not Function as Required ENS 477482012-03-16T08:00:00016 March 2012 08:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Refueling Water Storage Tank Connected to an Unqualified System ENS 480112011-05-04T17:25:0004 May 2011 17:25:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Refueling Water Storage Tank Connected to Non-Seismically Qualified System ENS 463172010-10-07T17:15:0007 October 2010 17:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Feedwater Isolation Inadvertently Disabled ENS 460452010-06-24T18:34:00024 June 2010 18:34:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Instrument Buses 3 and 8 Failed Causing Closure of Rhr Valves ENS 406172004-03-28T15:26:00028 March 2004 15:26:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Both Trains of High Pressure Safety Injection Inoperable for 25 Minutes 2015-01-29T00:57:00 | |