ENS 41444
ENS Event | |
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01:55 Feb 16, 2005 | |
Title | Possible Failure to Meet Design Basis Requirements of Positive Pressure in the Control Tower Envelope Following a Design Basis Accident. |
Event Description | The licensee provided the following information:
During operator rounds it was discovered that a double door for the control tower habitability envelope was propped open [from painting earlier in the day]. This condition would have resulted in not meeting the design basis requirements of maintaining a positive pressure inside the control tower envelope following a design basis accident. The doors were immediately closed. An issue report was generated and a prompt investigation was commenced in accordance with station policies. The NRC resident Inspector was notified.
The licensee provided the following information: An ENS notification (EN# 41444) was made at approximately 00:59 on 2/20/2005 regarding a potentially unanalyzed condition associated with a double door for the Control Tower Habitability Envelope, which was propped open. It was initially thought that this condition could have resulted in not meeting the design basis requirements for the Control Tower Envelope. However, an analysis of an air flow measurement across the open door has shown that the unfiltered air in-leakage into the Control Tower Habitability Envelop would not exceed the value assumed in the design basis accident analysis for Control Room Habitability. Since this event did not result in an unanalyzed condition, this event is being retracted. The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector. |
Where | |
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Three Mile Island Pennsylvania (NRC Region 1) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+239.07 h9.961 days <br />1.423 weeks <br />0.327 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Randy Campbell 00:59 Feb 26, 2005 |
NRC Officer: | Chauncey Gould |
Last Updated: | Mar 30, 2005 |
41444 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
---|---|
Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Three Mile Island with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 531062017-12-06T14:58:0006 December 2017 14:58:00
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