DCL-02-056, 1 to EP G-1, Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation

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1 to EP G-1, Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation
ML021340621
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  
Issue date: 05/03/2002
From: Becker J
Pacific Gas & Electric Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
DCL-02-056
Download: ML021340621 (15)
v • d • e


Text

SPacific Gas and Electric Company James R. Becker Diablo Canyon Power Plant Station Director Mail Code 104/5/504 PO. Box 56 Avila Beach, CA 93424 May 3, 2002 805.545.3462 Fax: 805.545.4234 PG&E Letter DCL-02-056 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Diablo Canyon Units I and 2 Emergency Plan Imolementing Procedure Update

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

In accordance with Section V, "Implementing Procedures," of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, enclosed is an update to the emergency plan (EP) implementing procedures for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units I and 2.

As provided under 10 CFR 50.54(q), the changes have been made without prior NRC approval since they do not decrease the effectiveness of the EP. The EP, as changed, continues to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

This update does not contain any privacylproprietary information in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 81-27.

If there are any questions regarding this update, please contact Mr. Mark Lemke of my staff at (805) 545-4787.

Sincerely, James R. ecer kyall 345 Enclosures cc:

David L. Proulx Girija S. Shukla cclenc: Ellis W. Merschoff (2)

A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Catlaway

  • Comanche Peak
  • Diablo Canyon
  • Palo Verde
  • South Texas Project a Wolf Creek PG&E Letter DCL-02-056 LOCATION OF PRIVACY/PROPRIETARY INFORMATION IN EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES FOR DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 Procedure Number Privacy/

Proprietary Information Title/Location of Privacy/Proprietary Information EP G-1 Revision 31 No Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation PG&E Letter DCL-02-056 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Table of Contents - Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume 1A (OM10.1D3 only), Volume 1B (OM10.DC1 only), and Volume 3B Rev.

Title OM10.1D3 OM10.DC1 EP G-1*

EP G-2 EP G-3 EP G-4 EP G-5 EP R-2 EP R-3 EP R-7 EP OR-3 EP RB-1 EP RB-2 EP RB-3 EP RB-4 EP RB-5 EP RB-8 EP RB-9 EP RB-10 EP RB-11 EP RB-12 EP RB-14 EP RB-15 EP EF-1 EP EF-2 EP EF-3 EP EF-4 EP EF-9 EP EF-10

  • Procedure included in this submittal Proc. No.

6 Emergency Plan Training 2

Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises 31 Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation 24 Activation and Operation of the Interim Site Emergency Organization (Control Room) 36 Notification of Off-Site Agencies and Emergency Response Organization Personnel 17 Personnel Assembly, Accountability and Site Access Control During Emergencies 9A Evacuation of Nonessential Site Personnel 19C Release of Airborne Radioactive Materials Initial Assessment 8C Release of Radioactive Liquids 13 Off-Site Transportation Accidents 6A Emergency Recovery 5B Personnel Dosimetry 4B Emergency Exposure Guides 4

Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking 4A Access to and Establishment of Controlled Areas Under Emergency Conditions 4C Personnel Decontamination 14 Instructions for Field Monitoring Teams 11 Calculation of Release Rate 7A Protective Action Recommendations 12 Emergency Offsite Dose Calculations 6

Plant Vent Iodine and Particulate Sampling During Accident Conditions 6

Core Damage Assessment Procedure 10 Post Accident Sampling System 27 Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center 25 Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center 20 Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility 13A Activation of the Mobile Environmental Monitoring Laboratory 8

Backup Emergency Response Facilities 4

Joint Media Center Activation and Operation

"*** ISSUED FOR USE BY:

DATE:

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE TITLE:

Emergenc EXPIRES:

NUMBER EP G-1 REVISION 31 PAGE 1 OF 3 UNITS

y Classification and Emergency Plan Activation 1AN 2 EFFECTIVE DATE PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION: QUALITY RELATED TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE SC O P E.........................................................................................................................

1 D ISC U SSIO N.................................................................................................................

1 D E FIN IT IO N S................................................................................................................

1 RESPONSIBILITIES.....................................................................................................

2 INSTRUCTIONS.........................................................................................................

3 R E C O R D S.....................................................................................................................

3 ATTACHMENTS.........................................................................................................

3 REFERENCES............................................................................................................

3

1.

SCOPE 1.1 This procedure describes accident classification guidelines and Emergency Plan activation responsibilities.

2.

DISCUSSION 2.1 The steps required by this procedure are in addition to the steps required to maintain the plant in, or restore the plant to, a safe condition.

2.2 Events not meeting the minimum classification criteria contained in this procedure should be reviewed for reportability in XII.ID2, "Regulatory Reporting Requirements and Reporting Process."

3.

DEFINITIONS 3.1 Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) 3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) - characterized by off-normal conditions that:

a.

May not in themselves be particularly significant from an emergency preparedness standpoint, but could reasonably indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant if proper action is not taken or if circumstances beyond the control of the operating staff render the situation more serious from a safety stand point. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected.

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER:

ER G-4.1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION. 31' PAGE 2 OF 3 TITLE:

Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation UNITS 1 AND 2 3.1.2 Alert - events in progress or having occurred, involving an actual or potentially substantial degradation of the plant safety level.

a.

Small releases of radioactivity may occur (greater than Technical Specification limits for normal operation, but only a small fraction of the EPA Protective Action Guideline (PAG) exposure levels at the site boundary). It is the lowest level where emergency offsite response may be anticipated.

b.

The lowest classification level where off-site emergency response is anticipated.

3.1.3 Site Area Emergency (SAE) - events which are in progress or have occurred involving actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public, but a core meltdown situation is not indicated based on current infornation.

a.

Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guides except near the site boundary. However, because the possible release is significant, care must be taken in alerting offsite authorities to distinguish whether the release is merely potential, likely, or actually occurring. Response of offsite authorities will be guided initially by this determination.

3.1.4 General Emergency (GE) - event(s) in progress or having occurred which indicate:

a.

Inminent substantial core degradation or melting.

b.

Potential for containment loss.

c.

Radioactive releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAGs off-site for more than the immediate area.

4.

RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Interim Site Emergency Coordinator (Interim SEC or ISEC) - Control room shift manager is responsible for initial event classification and emergency plan activation.

The ISEC may upgrade the event classification until relieved by either the SEC or RM.

In addition, the ISEC may downgrade a NUE to no ECL.

4.2 Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) - The SEC may upgrade the classification of an event until relieved by the Recovery Manager.

4.3 Recovery Manager (RM) - The RM, once staffed, is responsible for upgrading or downgrading ECLs, and may direct the SEC to change ECLs.

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029

PACIFIC,.AS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP G-1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 31 PAGE 3 OF 3 TITLE:

Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation UNITS 1 AND 2

5.

INSTRUCTIONS 5.1 The Interim Site Emergency Coordinator shall:

5.1.1 Initially classify and declare the event using ONLY the guidance in.1 of this procedure.

NOTE: Simultaneous EALs that increase, the probability of release require escalation of the ECL to one level above the higher EAL.

5.1.2 Formally announce all emergency classification declarations to the Control Room, TSC, or EOF, respectively.

5.2 The ISEC or SEC may:

5.2.1 Upgrade the event to a higher ECL until the Recovery Manager arrives at and assumes responsibility in the, EOF. However, the ISEC and SEC shall not downgrade an event classified at the Alert or higher level at any time.

The ISEC may downgrade a NUE to no ECL.

5.2.2 Only the Recovery Manager may downgrade an ECL at the Alert or higher level according to the most current controlling EAL.

6.

RECORDS 6.1 There are no quality or nonquality records generated by this procedure.

7.

ATTACHMENTS 7.1 "Emergency Action Level Classification Chart," 03/29/02

8.

REFERENCES 8.1 EP EF-1, "Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center."

8.2 EP EF-2, "Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center."

8.3 EP EF-3, "Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility."

8.4 EP OR-3, "Emergency Recovery."

8.5 EP G-3, "Notification of Offsite Agencies and Emergency Response Personnel."

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029

Page 1 of 9 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EP G-1 ATTACHMENT 7.1 1AD2 TITLE:

Emergency Action Level Classification Chart I. FIRE (All Modes)

I1. FUEL DAMAGE OR VESSEL DAMAGE (Modes 1-4)

UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Fire not under control within 15 minutes of initiating fire fighting efforts AND affecting plant equipment or power supplies in or near the Protected Area(s).
2. Indication of Fuel Damage as shown by:

Confirmed RCS sample shows

> 1001 E pCilgm specific activity (Tech Spec 3.4.8)

OR Confirmed RCS sample shows dose equivalent 1-131 activity > Tech Spec limit for Iodine Spike (Tech Spec Fig. 3.4-1).

Category II Continued on next page.

ALERT

1. Fire not under control within 15 minutes of initiating fire-fighting efforts AND threatening the loss of function of any of the following Safety Related systems required for safe shutdown:

Vital Power Supplies: D/Gs, DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC, or 125VDC Primary Systems and Auxiliaries:

RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging and Boration Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, 10% Dumps, SIG Safeties, or MSIVs Control Room, Cable Spreading Rooms, or HSDP.

2. Indication of Fuel Damage as shown by:

Confirmed RCS sample > 300 gCilcc of equivalent 1-131 specific activity OR equivalent fuel failure is measured by exposure rate from systems carrying reactor coolant per EP RB-14 Category II Continued on next pane.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Fire causing the complete loss of function of any one of the following safety related systems required for safe shutdown:

Vital Power Supplies: DIGs, DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC, or 125VDC Primary Systems and Auxiliaries:

RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging and Boration Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, 10% Dumps, SIG Safeties, or MSIVs Control Room, Cable Spreading Rooms, or HSDP.

See SAE #14 for Steam Line Break Category II Continued on next page.

SIT ARA EERGNCYGENERAL EMERGENC'Y

1. Site Emergency Coordinator judges that a fire could cause common damage to plant systems which is determined to have the potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.
2.

Degraded core with possible loss of coolable geometry as indicated by:

5 or more thermocouple readings

> 1200 deg. F.

OR LOCA with no indication of ECCS flow AND indication of fuel damage (See Alert #2)

OR LOCA with containment rad levels

> values for 100% gap release in EP RB-14.

Category II Continued on next oaae.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029 I

I I

=~

I i

03/29/02 GENERAL EMERGI:NCY

03/29/02 Page 2 of 9 EP G-1 (UNITS I AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY II. FUEL DAMAGE

3. Pressurized Thermal Shock is verified by
3. Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product OR entry into EOP FR-P.1 Barriers:

VESSEL DAMAGE AND (Modes 1-4)

Left of Limit A curve (EOP F-0).

A) Indication of fuel damage (See (Continued)

Alert #2)

AND Determination of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) which requires entry into EOP E-3 AND Steam release from ruptured SIG, either used for plant cooldown purposes or due to a steamline break.

B) Indication of Fuel Damage (See Alert #2)

AND Determination of a SGTR requiring entry into EOP E-3 AND Indication of a steam line break inside containment AND High potential for loss of containment integrity (e.g., loss of function of both Containment Spray trains OR loss of function of one Containment Spray train and four CFCUs).

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029

EP G-1 (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY II. FUEL DAMAGE

3. Pressurized Thermal Shock is verified by C) Indication of Fuel Damage (See OR entry into EOP FR-P.1 Alert #2)

VESSEL DAMAGE AND AND (Modes 1-4)

Left of Limit A curve (EOP F-O).

Determination of a SGTR which (Continued)

(Continued) requires entry into EOP E-3 AND Indication of a steam line break outside containment with inability to isolate the break.

D) Potential fuel damage indicated by incore thermocouples > 700 deg. F or RVLIS < 32%

AND LOCA as indicated by RCS leakage and SI AND J

Loss of containment integrity.

II1. FUEL

3. Fuel Handling Accident causing a
2. Fuel Handling Accident causing a HANDLING release in Containment or the Fuel release in Containment or the Fuel ACCIDENT Handling Building Handling Building (All Modes)

WITH WITH The potential to exceed the criteria The potential to exceed the criteria listed in Alert #4 or #5.

listed in SAE #3.

IV. LOSS OF

4. Projected dose rate at the Site Boundary
4. Projected dose rate at the Site
3. Projected dose at the Site Boundary
4. Projected dose at the Site Boundary CONTROL OR (800 meters) is Boundary (800 meters) is (800 meters) is (800 meters) is RELEASE OF

>0.057 mRemlhr TEDE

_0.57 mRemlhr TEDE

_ 100 mRem TEDE

> 1,000 mRem TEDE RADIOACTIVE OR OR OR OR MATERIAL

>- 0.170 mRem/hr Thyroid COE for actual

_ 1.7 mRem/hr Thyroid CDE for actual

> 500 mRem Thyroid CDE for actual or

> 5;000 mRem Thyroid CDE for (All Modes) or expected release.

or expected release.

expected release.

actual or expected release.

Category IV Continued on next page.

Category IV Continued on next page.

Category IV Continued on next page.

Category IV Continued on next page.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029 03/29/02 Page 3 of 9

03/29/02 Page 4 of 9 EP G-1 (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY IV. LOSS OF

5. A valid reading in excess of the isolation
5. Valid alarm on plant vent high range CONTROL OR setpoint, which fails to isolate the noble gas menitor RE-29.

RELEASE OF release on any of the Radiological NOTE: ALARMS AT STATE OES RADIOACTIVE Process Effluent Monitors:

SACRAMENTO.

MATERIAL RE.18 OR RE-23 (All Modes)

During discharge only.

(Continued)

6. An actual liquid release which exceeds
6. An actual liquid release which exceeds the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, lOx the limits of 10 CFR 20, Table 2, Col. 2 per CY2.11I.

Appendix B, Table 2, Col. 2 per CY2.113!.

7. Radiological Effluent Process Monitor
7. Unplanned or unanticipated increase of High Radiation Alarm with valid reading 1 R!hr or greater in any of the in excess of alarm setpoint on any of the following areas:

following monitors:

Passageways, OR RE-14114R Normally occupied areas, OR RE-24j24R Accessible areas normally RE-28128R.

< 100 mR/hr, OR Outside boundaries of Radiologically Controlled Areas AND for any area above, a potential exists for EITHER an uncontrolled release to the environment OR a loss of ability to maintain plant safety functions.

8. Unplanned or uncontrolled release to the
8. Unexplained increase of 50 X DAC in environment exceeding alarm setpoints airborne radioactivity outside the on RE-3.

boundary of the Radiologically Controlled Areas, but within the Plant Protected Area.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029

EP G-l (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY V. LOSS OF

9. Entry into OP AP-8A, "Control Room
4. Entry into OP AP-8A, "Control Room CONTROL Accessibility," AND controls Accessibility," AND controls not ROOM established within 15 minutes.

established within 15 minutes.

(All Modes)

VI. LOSS OF

9. Plant is not brought to required operating
5. Complete loss for greater than
5. Loss of Heat Sink indicated by:

ENGINEERED Mode within any applicable Tech Spec 15 minutes of any of the following Entry into EOP FR H.1 SAFETY Action Statement time limit (Modes 1-4).

functions needed to reach or maintain AND FEATURE Hot Shutdown (while in Modes 1-4):

Loss of water inventory in 3 SIGs

(< 23% [34%] Wide Range).

10. Loss of function of both RHR trains for
10. Loss of function of both RHR trains AFW capability greater than 15 minutes while in for greater than 15 minutes in Steam Dump System and SIG Safety Mode 5-or 6.

Modes 1-4.

Valves

11. A loss of function of all charging pumps
11. An unplanned shutdown of the RHR Loss of the capability to maintain RCS for greater than 15 minutes when System (while in Mode 5 or 6) for inventory as evidenced by a loss of all normally used for RCS inventory control

> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with no other normal means charging pumps coincident with the (Modes 1-4).

of decay heat removal available inability to depressurize and inject with (e.g., flooded reactor cavity-or steam the Safety Injection pumps generators with loops filled).

12. An unplanned loss of function of the Loss of capability to increase the Boric RHR System (Mode 5 or 6) for greater Acid concentration sufficient to than 15 minutes maintain Keff less than.99 in Mode 4 AND with a loss of capability to trip control RCS thermocouple temperature is rods projected to exceed 200 deg.F within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of RHR loss (see Appendix B of OP AP SD series)

Loss of electrical power or I&C for any OR of the above listed systems, causing a RCS thermocouple temperature complete loss of function.

exceeds 200 deg.F.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029 03/29/02 Page 5 of 9

03/29/02 Page 6 of 9 EP G-I (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 7.1 d

TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY VII.

12. Loss of all off-site power for greater
13. Loss of all off-site power for greater
6. Loss of all on-site AND off-site AC power See General Emergency Condition #5 LOSS OF POWER OR than 15 minutes AND at least 2 DIGs are than 15 minutes AND only 1 DIG is for > 15 minutes (Modes 1-4).

under LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY ALARMS OR supplying their vital busses (Modes 1-4).

supplying its vital bus (Modes 1-4).

FEATURE.

ASSESSMENT OR COMMUNICATIONS

13. Loss of all off-site power for greater
14. Loss of all off-site and on-site AC than 15 minutes AND at least 1 DIG is power for greater than 15 minutes in supplying its vital bus (Modes 5 and 6).

Modes 5 or 6.

i

14. Loss of all vital OC power as indicated
15. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated
7. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by by DC Bus 11(21), 12(22), and 13(23) by DC Bus 11(21), 12 (22) and 13 (23)

DC Bus 11 (21), 12 (22) and 13 (23) undervoltage for > 15 minutes undervoltage for < 15 minutes undervoltage for > 15 minutes (Modes 5-and 6)

(Modes 1-4).

(Modes 1-4).

15. Loss of assessment capabilities as indicated by a total loss of SPDS in the Control Room AND simultaneous loss of all displays for any "Accident Monitoring" variable in Tech Spec Table 3.3.3-1 for > 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> while in Modes 1, 2 or 3., *
16. Main Control Room Annunciators
16. Main Control Room Annunciators
8. Main Control Room Annunciators PKs 1 PKs I through 5 AND display capabilities PKs 1 through 5 AND display through 5 AND display capabilities AND AND typewriter all do not respond to an capabilities AND typewriter all do not typewriter all do not respond to an alarm alarm condition in Modes 1-4 for over respond to an alarm condition in condition in MODES 1-4 for over 15 minutes..

MODES 1-4 for over 15 minutes 15 minutes AND AND the plant is in a significant transient the plant is in a significant transient AND (plant trip, SI, or generator runback backup, nonaan unciating systems are not

>25 Mw/min), nonannunciating available (PPC, SPOS).

systems available.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029 I

EP G-1 (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification: Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY VII.

17. Total loss of communication capability LOSS OF POWER OR with off-site agencies (all Modes) as ALARMS OR indicated by the inability to communicate ASSESSMENT OR with SLO County (by telephone and COMMUNICATIONS radio)

(Continued)

OR the NRC Operations Center.'

VII.

18. Ground motion felt and recognized as an
17. Earthquake > 0.2 g verified by
9. Earthquake > 0.4 g verified by Seismic
6. Site Emergency Coordinator's NATURAL earthquake by a consensus of Control Seismic Monitors.

Monitors.

judgment that major internal or PHENOMENA Room operators on duty AND measuring external events (e.g.,

(All Modes) greater than O.01g on the Earthquake earthquakes, wind damage, ForceMonitor.

explosions, etc.) which could cause massive common damage to plant systems which is determined to have the potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.

19. Flooding of any plant structure that
18. High water exceeding Intake Structure
10. High water causing flooding of ASW causes initiation of entry to Mode 3 due main deck elevation or low water pump compartments or low water to a Tech Spec action statement.

causing cavitation and shutdown of causing the shutdown of both ASW both ASW pumps for < 15 minutes.

pumps for > 15 minutes.

20. Tsunami or Hurricane Warning from the
19. Sustained wind of 85 mph (38 mlsec)
11. Sustained wind speed > 100 mph State, NOAA, NWS, Coast Guard or at any elevation on the Met. Tower.

(45 mlsec).

System Dispatcher OR Observation of low or high water levels at the Intake Structure indicative of a Tsunami or Hurricane.

21. A tornado sighted within Site Boundary.
20. Tornado strikes the plant protected area.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029 03/29/02 Page 7 of 9

Page 8 of 9 EP G-1 (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUALEVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY IX.

22.

Report of airplane crash within the Site

21. Confirmed missile, airplane crash or
12.

Missile, airplane crash or explosion See General Emergency #6 above.

OTHER HAZARDS Boundary or unusual airplane activity explosion involving a plant structure in causing complete loss of a safety (All Modes) threatening the plant.

the protected area.

system function that causes entry into a Tech Spec Action Statement.

23.

Confirmed explosion on-site.

24.

Turbine failure causing casing

22. Turbine failure generating missiles that penetration OR damage to turbine or cause visual damage to other safety generator seals related structures, equipment, controls OR power sapplies.
25.

Significant release of flammable OR

23. Release of flammable OR toxic gas OR toxic gas OR liquid that prevents, even liquid that jeopardizes operation oa, with SCBAs, operations inside the safety related systems by either power block OR intake structure (ref.

preventing required access OR by CP M-9a).

threatening imminent damage.

X.

2R RI

". nirlantifi-n, IlO n fl2..

r-Q..

PRIMARY OR PRI/SEC OR SECONDARY LEAK)

(Modes 1-4 i

s I_

i U UUU IUOIy leakage that exceeds 10 gpm OR identified leakage that exceeds 25 gpm.

27.

SI Actuation with ECCS injection into the RCS resulting from a valid signal based on actual plant conditions.

NOTE: SI ACTUATION ALSO ALARMS AT OES IN SACRAMENTO.

28. Steam line break which results in SI actuation.

,-4. rurimary le3K rate > ou gpm.

25. Determination of a SGTR which results in entry into EOP E-3.
26. Determination of a steam line break with > 10 gpm Primary to Secondary 1

11n

29.

Failure of a PZR PORV AND Block Valve OR Safety Valve fails to reseat, excluding allowable leakage, following a pressure reduction below the reset point.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

I-

13. Known primary system LOCA during which RCS subcooling cannot be maintained >200 F OR PZR level cannot be maintained >4% (28% with adverse containment).
14. Determination of a SGTR coincident with steam release from ruptured SIG, either used for plant cooidown purposes or due to a steamline break.

See General Emergency #3 under Fuel or Vessel Damage.

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029 03/29/02

EP G-1 (UNITS 1 AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Xl.

27. Anticipated Transient Without Scram
15. An ATWS condition with no fuel damage
7. ATWS with Fuel Damage REACTOR (ATWS) as indicated by:

evident indications (see Alert Condition PROTECTION Failure of an automatic reactor trip to AND

  1. 2 under FUEL DAMAGE)

SYSTEM FAILURE trip the reactor.

An additional failure of a system OR (Modes 1-4) required for Hot Shutdown (See SAE #5)

ATWS with potential Core Melt to actuate.

indicated by incore thermocouples

> 700 deg. F AND

___RVLIS

< 32%.

XII.

30. Security reports the notification of a
28. Security reports ongoing security
16. Security reports ongoing physical attack
8. Security reports ongoing security SECURITY THREAT credible site-specific security threat or threat involving physical attack on the on the facility or a sabotage device threat which causes loss of (Modes 1-4) attempted entry or attempted sabotage.

facility or a sabotage device has been causing a confirmed loss of a safety control of the operations of the detected that threatens the operability system function that causes an entry plant to hostile forces.

of safety related equipment (see into a Tech Spec Action Statement (see Alert #1).

SAE #1).

XIII.

31. Site Emergency Coordinator determines
29. Site Emergency Coordinator judges
17. Site Emergency Coordinator judges that
9. Site Emergency Coordinator SITE EMERGENCY conditions warrant increased awareness plant conditions exist that warrant conditions exist that warrant activation judges conditions exist which COORDINATOR'S on the part of off-site authorities of.:

precautionary activation of the TSC of the emergency centers and have a potential to release JUDGMENT initiation of a plant shutdown per Tech and placing the EOF and other key monitoring teams or a precautionary radioactive material in quantities (All Modes)

Spec LCOs or involve other than normal emergency personnel on stand-by.

notification to the public near the site.

sufficient to cause exposures controlled shutdown.

comparable to General Emergency

  1. 4.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONELEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

00223631.doa 03B 0326.1029 03/29/02 Page 9 of 9

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