LER-1993-001, Forwards LER 93-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Which Occurred Following Failure of Main Feedwater Pump a & Resultant ESFAS Actuations.Ler Also Serves as Special Rept Describing Circumstances of ECCS Actuation |
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ACCKLERA7+D DOCUMENT DIST1BUTION SYSTEM REGUL RY.INFORMATION DISTRIBUTI..
SYSTEM (RIDS)
D ACCESSION NBR:9303150140 DOC.DATE: 93/03/04 NOTARIZED: NO
, DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,,J.M.
Arizona Public Service Co.
(formerly, Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION.
Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
R
SUBJECT:
Forwards LER 93-001-00 re reactor trip which occurred l
following failure of main feedwater pump A
& resultant ESFAS actuations.LER also serves as special rept describing circumstances of ECCS actuation.
.DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR i ENCL Q SIZE:
+ /0 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:Standardized plant.'5000530 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA
,TRAMMELL> C INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFBHE NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRSS/PRPB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: EGGG BRYCE,J.H NRC PDR NSIC POORE,W.
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. RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD TRAN,L'CRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DE/EELB, NRR/DORS/OEAB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRIL/RPEB N
/J3SSA SPLB EG F LE 02 RGN5 FILE 01 L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MURPHY>G.A NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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'OTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
'LEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT TIIE DOCUMEN P CON'I ROL D!~I'.
ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FII.()M DISTRIIIUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 33 ENCL 33
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Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P,O. BOX S2034
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PHOENIX, ARIZONA85072.2034 JAMES M, LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT NUCI.EAR PRODUCTION 192-00832-JML/TRB/KR March 4, 1993 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-37 Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 3 Docket No.
STN 50-530 (License No., NPF-74)
Licensee Event Report 93-001-00 File'3-020-404 Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 93-001-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.
This LER reports a Unit 3 reactoi trip which occurred following a failure of Main Feedwater Pump A, and resultant Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) actuations of both.
Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Systems (AFAS-1 and AFAS-2), the Safety Injection Actuation System (SIAS), and the Containment Isolation Actuation System (CIAS).
This LER also serves as a Special Report prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 ACTION b and TS 6.9.2 to describe the circumstances of the Emergency Core Cooling System actuation and the total accumulated actuation. cycles to date.
In accordance with 10CFR50.73(d),
a copy of this LER is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.'f you have any questions,* please contact T. R. Bradish,
- Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, at (602) 393-5421.
Very truly yours, JML/TRB/KR/kr Attachment (all with attachment)
'II303i50i40 930304 PDR ADOCK 05000530 S
PDR cc:
W. F.
Conway J.
B. Martin J.
A. Sloan INPO Records Center p.
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| 05000530/LER-1993-001-02, :on 930204,reactor Trip Occurred Due to SG 2 Water Level Reaching RPS Trip Setpoint for Low SG Water Level Following Loss of Main Feedwater Pump A.Caused by Failure of Circuit Board.Investigation Underway |
- on 930204,reactor Trip Occurred Due to SG 2 Water Level Reaching RPS Trip Setpoint for Low SG Water Level Following Loss of Main Feedwater Pump A.Caused by Failure of Circuit Board.Investigation Underway
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000530/LER-1993-001, Forwards LER 93-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Which Occurred Following Failure of Main Feedwater Pump a & Resultant ESFAS Actuations.Ler Also Serves as Special Rept Describing Circumstances of ECCS Actuation | Forwards LER 93-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Which Occurred Following Failure of Main Feedwater Pump a & Resultant ESFAS Actuations.Ler Also Serves as Special Rept Describing Circumstances of ECCS Actuation | | | 05000528/LER-1993-001, Corrected Ltr Forwarding LER 93-001-00,containing Rept Date & Correct Page Numbers.Ler Discusses Manual Reactor Trip as Result of Automatic Main Turbine Trip | Corrected Ltr Forwarding LER 93-001-00,containing Rept Date & Correct Page Numbers.Ler Discusses Manual Reactor Trip as Result of Automatic Main Turbine Trip | | | 05000528/LER-1993-001-01, :on 930130,main Turbine Trip Occurred Which Initiated Manual Reactor Trip After Receiving High Pressurizer Pressure Pretrip Alarm.Caused by Failure of High Tank Level Controller.Failed Controller Replaced |
- on 930130,main Turbine Trip Occurred Which Initiated Manual Reactor Trip After Receiving High Pressurizer Pressure Pretrip Alarm.Caused by Failure of High Tank Level Controller.Failed Controller Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000529/LER-1993-001-03, :on 930314,reactor Manually Tripped Following Steam Generator Tube Rupture.Investigation Team Formed & Investigation Initiated Per Incident Investigation Program. Results Will Be Provided in Supplemental LER |
- on 930314,reactor Manually Tripped Following Steam Generator Tube Rupture.Investigation Team Formed & Investigation Initiated Per Incident Investigation Program. Results Will Be Provided in Supplemental LER
| | | 05000529/LER-1993-001, :on 930314,SG Tube Ruptured in SG 2.Caused by Iga/Isgcc Occurring as Result of Tube to Tube Crevice Formation.Implemented Changes to EOP |
- on 930314,SG Tube Ruptured in SG 2.Caused by Iga/Isgcc Occurring as Result of Tube to Tube Crevice Formation.Implemented Changes to EOP
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1993-002, Forwards LER 93-002-00 Re Discovery That Design Basis Fire in Control Room,Concurrent W/Loss of Offsite Power Could Result in Loss of Control Room Power to Train B DG Output Breaker & Essential Exhaust Fan Breaker | Forwards LER 93-002-00 Re Discovery That Design Basis Fire in Control Room,Concurrent W/Loss of Offsite Power Could Result in Loss of Control Room Power to Train B DG Output Breaker & Essential Exhaust Fan Breaker | | | 05000529/LER-1993-002-01, :on 930518,determined That 15 Out of 20 MSSV & Pressure Safety Valves Out of Tolerence Limit Specified in TS 3.7.1.1 & 3.4.2.2.Cause of Setpoint Drift Being Investigated.Valve Setpoints Readjusted |
- on 930518,determined That 15 Out of 20 MSSV & Pressure Safety Valves Out of Tolerence Limit Specified in TS 3.7.1.1 & 3.4.2.2.Cause of Setpoint Drift Being Investigated.Valve Setpoints Readjusted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000529/LER-1993-002, :on 930518,determined That 15 of 20 MSSV & 4 of 4 Pressurizer Safety Valves as-found Relief Settings Out of Tolerence Limits.Valves Exhibited Seat Wear.Efforts to Enhance MSSV Setpoint Repeatability Continuing |
- on 930518,determined That 15 of 20 MSSV & 4 of 4 Pressurizer Safety Valves as-found Relief Settings Out of Tolerence Limits.Valves Exhibited Seat Wear.Efforts to Enhance MSSV Setpoint Repeatability Continuing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1993-003, :on 930213,normal Supply Breaker to non-Class 1E 13.8 Kv Intermediate Bus Opened on Overcurrent,Resulting in Loss of Power to Train A.Caused by Insulation Breakdown on Breaker Bushing.Damaged Breaker Removed |
- on 930213,normal Supply Breaker to non-Class 1E 13.8 Kv Intermediate Bus Opened on Overcurrent,Resulting in Loss of Power to Train A.Caused by Insulation Breakdown on Breaker Bushing.Damaged Breaker Removed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1993-003-01, Forwards LER 93-003-01,providing Addl Info on Root Cause of Failure & Component Failure Data | Forwards LER 93-003-01,providing Addl Info on Root Cause of Failure & Component Failure Data | | | 05000528/LER-1993-004, :on 930520,ASME Section XI Testing of Charging Pumps Not in Compliance W/Code Requirements Due to Personnel Error.C/As:Testing in Accordance W/Asme Section XI Code Requirements |
- on 930520,ASME Section XI Testing of Charging Pumps Not in Compliance W/Code Requirements Due to Personnel Error.C/As:Testing in Accordance W/Asme Section XI Code Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(5) | | 05000530/LER-1993-004-01, :on 931103,reactor Manually Tripped After Recognizing That Subgroup 5 of CEA Regulating Group 4 Slipped Into Reactor Core During Reactor Power Reduction. CEA Regulating Group 4 Will Be Monitored |
- on 931103,reactor Manually Tripped After Recognizing That Subgroup 5 of CEA Regulating Group 4 Slipped Into Reactor Core During Reactor Power Reduction. CEA Regulating Group 4 Will Be Monitored
| | | 05000529/LER-1993-005, :on 931123,identified That SR 4.8.1.1.1.a Which Verifies Operability of Ac Offsite Sources Not Completed within Required Time (1 H) Due to Cognitive Personnel Error. Surveillance Completed W/No Problems on 931123 |
- on 931123,identified That SR 4.8.1.1.1.a Which Verifies Operability of Ac Offsite Sources Not Completed within Required Time (1 H) Due to Cognitive Personnel Error. Surveillance Completed W/No Problems on 931123
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000529/LER-1993-005-01, :on 931123,identified That SR 4.8.1.1.1.a Had Not Been Completed within Required 1 H Timeframe.Caused by Personnel Error.Required Surveillance Completed Satisfactorily on 931123 |
- on 931123,identified That SR 4.8.1.1.1.a Had Not Been Completed within Required 1 H Timeframe.Caused by Personnel Error.Required Surveillance Completed Satisfactorily on 931123
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1993-005, :on 920728,identified That Redundant Trains of Safe Shutdown Equipment Could Be Rendered Inoperable by Single Fire.Fire Watches Manned in Any Area Not Already Under Conpensatory Fire Watch |
- on 920728,identified That Redundant Trains of Safe Shutdown Equipment Could Be Rendered Inoperable by Single Fire.Fire Watches Manned in Any Area Not Already Under Conpensatory Fire Watch
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000530/LER-1993-005-02, :on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action Issued |
- on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action Issued
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1993-006-01, Forwards LER 93-006-01,providing Addl Info on Status of Unit 2 During Event | Forwards LER 93-006-01,providing Addl Info on Status of Unit 2 During Event | | | 05000528/LER-1993-006, :on 930505,determined That Original Design of Shutdown Suction Isolation Valve Motor Control Circuits May Not Meet Requirements for Overload Protection Bypass.Cause Under Investigation.Lco 3.8.4.2 Entered & Mods Completed |
- on 930505,determined That Original Design of Shutdown Suction Isolation Valve Motor Control Circuits May Not Meet Requirements for Overload Protection Bypass.Cause Under Investigation.Lco 3.8.4.2 Entered & Mods Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1993-007, :on 930512,concluded That TS SR 4.7.9.e Incorrectly Interpreted.Pvngs Snubber Testing Program Will Be Revised to Correctly Implement TS Requirements Prior to Commencing Next Testing Cycle |
- on 930512,concluded That TS SR 4.7.9.e Incorrectly Interpreted.Pvngs Snubber Testing Program Will Be Revised to Correctly Implement TS Requirements Prior to Commencing Next Testing Cycle
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1993-007-02, Corrected Ltr Forwarding LER 93-007-02,changing Corrective Action Due Date to Coincide W/Reply to Notice of Violation 50-528/93-12-04.W/o Encl | Corrected Ltr Forwarding LER 93-007-02,changing Corrective Action Due Date to Coincide W/Reply to Notice of Violation 50-528/93-12-04.W/o Encl | | | 05000528/LER-1993-008, :on 930224,gaseous Radwaste Sys Oxygen Monitor Out of Svc for 18 Days Due to Random Component Failure. Updated Grs Explosive Gas Monitoring Sys |
- on 930224,gaseous Radwaste Sys Oxygen Monitor Out of Svc for 18 Days Due to Random Component Failure. Updated Grs Explosive Gas Monitoring Sys
| | | 05000528/LER-1993-009, :on 931022,determined That 18 of 20 MSSVs & 4 of 4 Pressurizer Safety Valves Setpoints (Psv) Out of Tolerence Due to Setpoint Drift.Mssvs & Psvs Lift Setpoints Adjusted within TS Limits |
- on 931022,determined That 18 of 20 MSSVs & 4 of 4 Pressurizer Safety Valves Setpoints (Psv) Out of Tolerence Due to Setpoint Drift.Mssvs & Psvs Lift Setpoints Adjusted within TS Limits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(5) | | 05000528/LER-1993-010, :on 931105,determined That,In Past,Capability of Number of MOVs to Perform Intended Safety Function,Under Design Basis Condition Questionable.Planned Testing of MOVs to Meet GL 89-10 Performance Criteria Expected to Continue |
- on 931105,determined That,In Past,Capability of Number of MOVs to Perform Intended Safety Function,Under Design Basis Condition Questionable.Planned Testing of MOVs to Meet GL 89-10 Performance Criteria Expected to Continue
| | | 05000528/LER-1993-011, Forwards Suppl 1 to LER 93-011 Per 10CFR50.73,reporting That Addl Undervoltage Scenario Has Been Identified That Could Result in Possible Double Sequencing of SR Equipment | Forwards Suppl 1 to LER 93-011 Per 10CFR50.73,reporting That Addl Undervoltage Scenario Has Been Identified That Could Result in Possible Double Sequencing of SR Equipment | |
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