05000498/FIN-2017002-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Establish Procedures for Control of High - Energy Line Break Barriers |
Description | Green . The inspectors identified a non -cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to establish adequate procedures for the control of high -energy line break barriers. Specifically, on July 21, 2016, the inspectors identified that Procedure 0PGP03 -ZA -0514, Controlled System or Barrier Impairment, Revision 14, did not have any guidance on the control of barriers used for high -energy line breaks, despite the fact that the auxiliary feedwater pump room watertight doors are credited in the safety analyses for protection against such breaks. After discussing the acceptability of having both doors open simultaneously, the licensee shut the watertight door to auxiliary feedwater pump room for train A, and entered this condition into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2016 -9006. The failure to prescribe procedures for the control of high -energy line break doors was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, Procedure 0PGP03 -ZA -0514, Controlled System or Barrier Impairment, Revision 14, did not provide adequate procedures for the control of hazard barriers, which called the operability of the train A auxiliary feedwater system into question. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At -Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Quest ions, the issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non- technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. The NRC determined that this finding did not have a cross -cutting aspect because the most significant contributor to the performance deficiency did not reflect current licensee performance. Specifically, the auxiliary feedwater pump evaluation was performed in 2000; therefore, the performance deficiency occurred outside of the nominal 3- year period for present performance. |
Site: | South Texas ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000498/2017002 Section 4OA2 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Sanchez N Hernandez I Anchando J Braisted W Cullum N Okonkwo C Smith |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2017002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2017Q2
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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