05000498/FIN-2015002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Properly Dedicate Essential Chiller Purge Check Valves |
| Description | The inspectors documented a self-revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to have adequate measures for the selection and review for suitability of application of parts that are essential to the safety-related functions of structures, systems and components. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly inspect and test essential chiller condenser purge check valves during the stations commercial dedication process to ensure proper function in their safety-related application. The licensee has entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 15-4990 and has implemented corrective actions to the technical evaluation that will adequately measure and test the purge check valve in the future. The failure to properly inspect and test essential chiller condenser check valves during the stations commercial dedication process to ensure proper function in the safety-related application was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, on January 18, 2015, March 5, 2015, and March 21, 2015, the inadequately dedicated purge check valves resulted in a trip of the essential chiller, rendering the train inoperable and challenging plant operations. Using NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the design or qualification of the system, did not result in a loss of system function, did not represent a loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specifications allowed outage time, and did not cause the loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance. The inspectors determined that the finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the main contributor to the cause of the performance deficiency occurred in 1993. |
| Site: | South Texas  |
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| Report | IR 05000498/2015002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sanchez B Baca C Stott J O'Donnell N Hernandez N Taylor R Kopriva |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2015002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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