05000498/FIN-2010005-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Install the Required Number of Smoke Detectors (4) in the Auxiliary Shutdown Rooms |
Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of license condition 2.E, Fire Protection Program, for the failure to install the required number of smoke detectors (four) in the auxiliary shutdown room per the National Fire Protection Association Standard 72E-1978 on automatic fire detection. On October 5, 2010, during a quarterly fire inspection walkdown of the auxiliary shutdown room, the inspectors identified that the room only had three smoke detectors. The inspectors questioned whether three smoke detectors were sufficient for the size of the room (950 square feet). After further evaluation, the licensee concluded that an additional smoke detector needed to be installed. The licensees corrective action is to install another smoke detector in each units auxiliary shutdown room. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences because a fire may not be detected in time to prevent damage to the auxiliary shutdown panel rendering it unavailable or unreliable. The inspectors performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, dated February 28, 2005, because the finding affected fire protection defense-in-depth strategies, as described in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Table 3b, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated January 10, 2008. The finding was assigned to the fixed fire protection systems category with a degradation rating of moderate because the room was missing 25 percent of the required smoke detection equipment. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the deltacore damage frequency of 2.34E-7 was less than the 1.0E-5 value in Table 1.4.3, Phase 1 Quantitative Screening Criteria, of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F. This finding did not have crosscutting aspects because the condition existed since initial plant start up (Section 1R05). |
Site: | South Texas ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000498/2010005 Section 1R05 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Tharakan W Walker A Fairbanks J Kramer S Hedger C Denissen L Micewski J Dixon G Guerra P Elkmann |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2010005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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