05000446/LER-2018-002, Automatic Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System
| ML19029A146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 01/16/2019 |
| From: | Dreyfuss J Luminant, TXU Energy, Vistra Energy |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CP-201900018, TXX-19003 LER 2018-002-00 | |
| Download: ML19029A146 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 4462018002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
CP-201900018 TXX-19003 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 1/16/2019 Y!S!'!!.I\\
ENERGY
~~TXU I et
'f* energy Luminant
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-446 AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 446/18-002-00
Dear Sir or Madam:
John R. Dreyfuss Plant Manager Luminant P.O. Box 1002 6322 North FM 56 Glen Rose, TX 76043 o 254.897.5200 Ref 10 CFR 50. 73 Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Vistra Operations Company LLC (Vistra OpCo), hereby submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report 446/18-002-00, "Automatic Actuation Of Auxiliary Feedwater System" for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Unit 2.
This communication contains no new licensing basis commitments regarding CPNPP Unit 2.
6555 SIERRA DRIVE IRVING, TEXAS 75039 0214-812-4600 VISTRAENERGY.COM
TXX-19003 Page 2 of 2 If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Gary L. Merka at 254-897-6613.
Enclosure c-Scott A. Morris, Region IV Margaret Watford O'Banion, NRR Resident Inspectors, Comanche Peak
NRCFORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2017) httg://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)
the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant 05000 446 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Automatic Actuation Of Auxiliary Feedwater System
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACiLITIES INVOLVED I
SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 12 03 2018 2018 -
002 -
00 01 16 2019 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITIED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: {Check all that apply)
D 20.2201(b>
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 D 20.2201(d>
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D so.13(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[Z] 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2>,n>
D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
D 50.13(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 13.11 (a)(4>
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D so.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.11,a)(s)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D so.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.11(a)(1) 100 D
20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73.77(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in SUMMARY OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES At 0315 on December 3, 2018, CPNPP experienced a loss of the 138 kV West Bus [EIIS: (FK)(JX)]. Since the 138 kV East Bus was out of service for transmission line maintenance, this resulted in a transfer of the Unit 2 safety buses to the alternate off site power source and an actuation of both Unit 2 blackout sequencers and an automatic start of both Unit 2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (MDAFWPs) [EIIS: (BA)(P)] and the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump (TDAFWP) [EIIS: (BA)(P)]. The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start since they were not required to start due to a successful bus transfer. The MDAFWPs and the TDAFWP were returned to automatic. The off site source was recovered at 0416 on December 3, 2018. There was no impact on Unit 1.
E. THE METHOD OF DISCOVERY OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE, OR PROCEDURAL PERSONNEL ERROR Operators (Utility, Licensed) in the Unit 2 Control Room received alarms related to "Loss Of Startup/Station Service Transformers."
II. COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURES A. CAUSE OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE Not applicable - There were no component or system failures with any CPNPP comP,onents during this event. The loss of the 138 kV West Bus was caused by a fault on off site metering equipment owned by another electric company.
- 8. FALURE MODE, MECHANISM, AND EFFECTS OF EACH FAILED COMPONENT Not applicable - No CPNPP component or system failures were Identified during this event.
. C. SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS THAT WERE AFFECTED BY FAILURE OF COMPONENTS WITH MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS Not applicable - No CPNPP component or system failures were Identified during this event.
D. FAILED COMPONENT INFORMATION
Not applicable - No CPNPP component or system failures were identified during this event.
Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT A. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES THAT OCCURRED The Unit 2 safety b1,1ses transferred to the alternate off site power source, both Unit 2 blackout sequencers actuated, and both Unit 2 MDAFWPs and the Unit 2 TDAFWP automatically started as designed.
B. DURATION OF SAFETY SYSTEM TRAIN INOPERABILITY This event did not involve the inoperability of any safety systems. Off site power is not credited in Chapter 15 of the CPNPP Final Safety Analysis Report, therefore, offsite power is not considered a safety system.
C. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT During this event, the 345kV switchyard was available and stable. Unit 2 remained at 100 percent power and Unit 1 was not affected by this event. All plant safety systems responded as designed during this event. This event had no impact on nuclear safety, reactor safety, radiological safety, environmental safety or the safety of the public. This event has been evaluated to not meet the definition of a safety system functional failure per 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v).
IV. CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The loss of the 138 KV West Bus was caused by a fault on off site metering equipment that is owned by another electric company.
V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The M DAFWPs and the TDAFWP were returned to automatic. The off site source was recovered at 0416 on December 3, 2018. There were no component or system failures with any CPNPP components during this event.
VI. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
There have been no previous similar reportable events at CPNPP in the last three years. Page 3
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