05000446/LER-2018-002-01, Automatic Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System
| ML19199A032 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/2019 |
| From: | Dreyfuss J Luminant, TXU Energy, Vistra Energy |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CP-201900437, TXX-19074 LER 2018-002-01 | |
| Download: ML19199A032 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 4462018002R01 - NRC Website | |
text
CP-201900437 TXX-19074 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 7/11/2019 V!ST!?.I\\
ENERGY
- - 1*rxu I m
9'* energy Luminant
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-446 AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 446/18-002-01
Dear Sir or Madam:
John R. Dreyfuss Plant Manager Luminant P.O. Box 1002 6322 North FM 56 Glen Rose, TX 76043 o 254.897.5200 Ref 10 CFR 50. 73 Pursuant to 10CFRS0.73, Vistra Operations-Company LLC (Vistra OpCo), hereby submits the enclosed Licensee fvent Report 446/18-002.-01, "Automatic Actuation Of Auxiliary Feedwater System" for Comanche Peak Nuclear
. Power Plant (CPNPP) Unit 2.
This communication contains nCJ new licensing basis commitments regarding CPNPP Unit 2.
6555 SIERRA DRIVE IRVING, TEXAS 75039 0214-812-4600 pf-2-2.-
ft}f<t VISTRAENERGY.COM
TXX-19074 Page 2 of 2 If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Gary L. Merka at 254-897-6613.
Enclosure c-Scott A. Morris, Region IV Natreon Jordan, NRR Resident Inspectors, Comanche Peak Sincerely,
NRCFORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-20.17)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
_fr.,.JJ:RREG11~.. Q'l!.,
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information* Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S.
J Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-man to lnfocollects.
~
~
(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)
Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
~,.,
.It NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control _number, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)
the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant 05000 446 1.OF 3
- 4. TITLE Automatic Actuation Of Auxiliary Feedwater System
- 5. EVENT DATE
. 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- a. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED.
.I SEcilJENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 12 03 2018 2018 -
002 -
01 07 11 2019 05000 9.. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT fS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 202201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 D 20.2201(d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
- D ~0.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B_)
D 20.2203(ai(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D so.13(ai(2)(iii)
- D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[ZJ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x).
- 10. POWER LEVEL D 2ci.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(~)(1)(1i)_(A)
D 50.73(~)(2)(v)(A)
_ D 73.71(a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.:ia(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B_)
- D 73.71(a)(5)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 5o.4a(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
. D 73.77(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D ClTHER S~ecify in* Abstract below or in =
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE REPORTABLE EVENT
A. REPORTABLE EVENT CLASSIFICATION This event is report,able under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), .Any event or condition that,resulted in mariual or automatic.
actua{ipn of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section.". The system that actuated was the Uriit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System.
B. PLANT CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT At 0315 on December 3, 2018, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Unit 2 was.in MODE 1 operating at 100%
p~wer.
C. STATUS OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, OR COMPONENTS THAT WERE INOPERABLE AT THE START OF THE.
EVENJAND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT At the start of,this event, _the 138 k'< East Bus was out of service for transmission line maintenance.
D. NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES At 0315 on DElcernber 3, _2018, CPNPP experienqEld a loss of the 138 kV West Bus [EIIS: (FK)(JX)]. Since the 13& kV East Bus was out of service for tran.smission line maintenance, this resulted in a transfer of the Unit ~ safety buses to the.
a_lternate off site power source and an actuation of both Unit 2 blackout sequencers and an automatic start of both Unit 2..
- Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (MDAFWPs) [EIIS: (BA)(P)] and. the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater:
- pump (TDAFvYP) [EIIS: (BA)(P)]. The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start since they were not required to start du~do a successful bus transfer. Tpe MDAFVVPs and the TDAFWP were returned to automatic. The off site source was recovere.d at.0416 on Decemb.er 3; 2018. There was no impact on Unit 1.:
- E. THE: METHOD OF DISCOVERY OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE, OR PROCEDURAL PERSONNEL ERROR Operators (LJtility, Licensed) in the Unit 2 Control Room receivEld alcirms rEJlatec;l to "Loss Of Startup/Station Service Transformers. II IL: COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURES A. CAUSE OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE Not applicable - There were no component or system failures with ar;iy CPNPP components during th)s event. The loss of t.h~ 138 kV West Bus was caused by a fault on off site metering equipment owbed by another el.edric company; B. FAL.,t.iRE MODE:: MECHANISM, AND EFFECTS OF EACH ~FAILED COMPONENT Not applicabl~ - No CPNPP component or system failures were Identified during this evenr C. SYS"T;EMS OR SECONDA~Y -FUNCTIONS THAT WERE AFFECTED BY FAILURE OF COMPONENTS WITH MUL 1IPLE FUNCTIONS No~ applicable - No CPN,PP component or system failure~ were lde11tified during this event.
. NRC FORM.366A (04-2017)
. Page
- i qf 3
D. FAILED COMPONENT INFORMATION
Not applicable - No CPNPP component or system failures were identified during this event.
Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT A.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSE.S THAT OGCURRED The Unit 2 safety buses transferred to the alternate off site power source, both Unit 2 blackout sequencers actuated, and both Unit 2 MDAFWPs and the Unit 2 TDAFWP aut,omatically started as designed.
B. DURATION OF SAFETY SYSTEM TRAIN INOPERABILITY This event did not involve the inoperability of any safety systems.. Off site power is not credited. in Chapter 15 of the CPNPP.Final Safety Analysis Report, therefore, offsite power is not cor]sidered a safety system.
c: SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT During this event, the 345kV switchyard was*available and stable.. Unit 2 power was reduced by 50 MW, and Unit 1 was** 1 not affected by this event All plant safety systems respor:ideq as designed during this event. This event had no. impact on nuclear safety, reactor safety, radiological safety, environmental safety or the safety of the public. This event has been ev~luated to not meet the definition of a safety system functional failure per 1 d CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v)..
IV. CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The loss of the 138 KV West Bus was caused by a fault on off site metering equipment that is owneq by another electric.
company.
V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The MDAFWPs and the TDAFWP were returned to automatic. The.off site source was recovered at 0416 cin December 3, 2018. There were no component or system failures with any CPNPP components during this event.
VI. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
There have been no previous similar reportable ev~nts at CPNPP in the last thr~e years. Page qt 3