05000425/FIN-2013002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Operations and Maintenance Procedures Results in High RCP Seal Leakoff Flow and Manual Reactor Trip |
| Description | A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was identified for failure to provide adequate work instructions in the operations procedure used to change out the reactor coolant system (RCS) filter. Specifically, operations procedure 13213-1/2, Backflushable Filter System, which is used to change out the RCS filter, did not provide adequate instructions and/or precautions to prevent excessive air intrusion (and the subsequent localized crud burst within the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) late in core life) when flushing and venting the RCS filter housing. The licensee conducted a root cause investigation and entered the event into their corrective action program (condition report (CR) 597293). The licensee immediately created a Standing Order for Operation of CVCS in relation to RCP seals, and revised procedure 13213-1/2, Backflushable Filter System to provide instructions to significantly reduce the amount of air intrusion from changing out the RCS filter. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the reactor safety - initiating events cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions to operations personnel resulted in a localized crud burst at the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals causing RCP seal leakoff flow rates to exceed administrative limits for continued pump operation and a subsequent manual reactor trip. Because the inspectors answered No to all of the IMC 0609 Appendix A (dated June 19, 2012) Exhibit 1, Section B, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). Since the inadequate procedures have existed since plant startup, this violation is not indicative of current licensee performance and does not have an associated cross-cutting aspect assigned. |
| Site: | Vogtle  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000425/2013002 Section 1R11 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.11 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Abbott P Cooper J Fuller E Michel C Huffman D Harmon M Ernstes J Seat D Failla S Alexander C Oelstrom A Artayet J Vasquez F Ehrhardt R Hamilton R Carrion M Cain M Coursey T Chandler R Williams J Rivera |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Vogtle - IR 05000425/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Vogtle) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Vogtle)
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