05000424/FIN-2011003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Technical Specification (TS) 3.0, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Applicability, LCO 3.0.3 requires that when a TS LCO is not met and an associated ACTION is not provided, the licensee shall initiate actions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Contrary to the above, the licensee unknowingly operated Unit 2 in a condition where both trains of high head safety injection (HHSI) were inoperable and thus outside the conditions stated in TS 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, LCO 3.5.2 for a period of 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> without entering the required actions of LCO 3.0.3. At 0400 on January 27, 2010 the 2A HHSI pump was tagged out of service for planned maintenance with the unit in Mode 1. This maintenance activity was a hold-over from the previous A train work week and was now a protected train exception. At 0921 on January 28, 2010 the automatic start capability of the 2B HHSI pump (in response to an safety injection (SI) signal) was defeated when the B train solid state protection system (SSPS) mode switch was placed in TEST to allow surveillance testing of the 2B reactor trip breaker. Since the 2A HHSI pump was tagged out of service for maintenance and the 2B HHSI pump would not have automatically started on an SI signal, both trains of ECCS were rendered inoperable. The SSPS mode switch remained in the TEST position until it was returned to NORMAL at 1150 following successful completion of the reactor trip breaker surveillance. Thus for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 29 minutes, Unit 2 was operated in a condition prohibited by TS 3.5.2, which is applicable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. Since the unit was operating outside the conditions specified in the TS, the licensee should have entered into TS LCO 3.0.3, and initiated actions to shutdown and cool down the reactor within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. This finding initially screened greater than green using the IMC 609 Phase 1 worksheet due to the total loss of system safety function. Subsequently, a Phase 2 screening of the finding was conducted using the risk-informed inspection notebook. The Phase 2 screening showed the finding to be green due to the possibility of rapid operator action to recover the B train ECCS equipment and the short duration of the event. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 2010110738, completed an apparent cause determination, issued LER 05000425/2010-002, and completed all applicable corrective actions. |
| Site: | Vogtle  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000424/2011003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Chandler T Su C Smith M Cain M Speck R Patterson R Williams S Shaeffer |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Vogtle - IR 05000424/2011003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Vogtle) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Vogtle)
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