05000423/LER-2013-004, Regarding Failed Surveillance Test of a Train Control Room Emergency Filtration System

Regarding Failed Surveillance Test of a Train Control Room Emergency Filtration System

ML13142A033
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	05/08/2013
From:	Scace S Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Dominion
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 13-004-00
Download: ML13142A033 (6)

LER-2013-004, Regarding Failed Surveillance Test of a Train Control Room Emergency Filtration System

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
4232013004R00 - NRC Website

text

Domi nion Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, CT 06385 Web Address: www.don.com MAY 0 8 2013 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2013-004-00 FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST OF A TRAIN FILTRATION SYSTEM Serial No.13-220 MPS Lic/LES RO Docket No.

50-423 License No.

NPF-49 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2013-004-00 documenting a condition discovered at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 on March 13, 2013.

This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. William D. Bartron at (860) 444-4301.

Sincerely,

/Stejphh heCae5c Site Vice President - Millstone Attachments: 1 Commitments made in this letter: None

Serial No.13-220 Docket No. 50-423 Licensee Event Report 2013-004-00 Page 2 of 2 cc:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 2100 Renaissance Blvd, Suite 100 King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 N. S. Morgan Project Manager - Millstone Power Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 0-8C2 Rockville, MD 20852-2738 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Millstone Power Station

Serial No.13-220 Docket No. 50-423 Licensee Event Report 2013-004-00 ATTACHMENT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2013-004-00 FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST OF A TRAIN CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10/2010)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, digits/characters for each block) and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE Millstone Power Station - Unit 3 05000423 1 OF 3

4. TITLE Failed Surveillance Test of A Train Control Room Emergency Filtration System

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED S

RE FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER ISEQUENTIAL REV I

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 03 13 2013 2013- 004- 00 05 08 2013 05000

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR :._Check all that apply)

9. OPERATING MODE 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

H 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71 (a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71 (a)(5) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in

1.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 13, 2013, at 1741 hours0.0202 days <br />0.484 hours <br />0.00288 weeks <br />6.624505e-4 months <br /> with Millstone Power Station Unit 3 operating in MODE 1 at 100 percent power, a charcoal filter sample was drawn from the A Train Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS). On March 19, 2013, Engineering was notified by the vendor who performs the testing that the methyl iodide penetration test performed on the charcoal filter sample had failed. Accordingly, it was concluded that the A CREFS was actually inoperable on March 13, 2013, when the sample was originally taken. The surveillance test was prescribed by Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.7.d, which states, "After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber [FLT] operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, shows the methyl iodide penetration less than or equal to 2.5% when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-89 at a temperature of 3000 (86°F), and a relative humidity of 70%, and a face velocity of 54 ft/min." The actual test results were 4.46% penetration. Operators were notified, and the A CREFS was declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.7, on March 19, 2013, at 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br />. The charcoal filter was replaced and retested satisfactory. The A Train CREFS was declared operable on March 21, 2013, at 2236 hours0.0259 days <br />0.621 hours <br />0.0037 weeks <br />8.50798e-4 months <br />. The condition existed for longer than allowed by TS 3.7.7, Action (a), i.e., for more than 7 days.

Therefore, this is a reportable condition per 10 CFR 50.73 (A)(2)(i)(B) as any event or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

2.

CAUSE

The apparent cause is a failure to establish administrative limits for replacement of the CREFS charcoal filters, prior to reaching its TS limit.

3.

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The purpose of the control room emergency filtration system is to provide clean filtered air to control building occupants to limit post accident radiation exposures to 5 Rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) or less. The documented test results for methyl iodide penetration of the charcoal sample were compared with the values assumed in analyses for the Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) and for Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCA) in Chapter 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for MPS3. Per the Standard Review Plan, charcoal filter efficiency is assumed based on the required acceptance criteria for penetration with a safety factor of two. Therefore, the analyses assumed an overall efficiency of 100% - (2.5% x 2) = 95%. Based on the above, the level of degradation of the charcoal found in the surveillance test would not have prevented the filter/adsorber units from performing the assumed design safety function. Therefore, the significance of this issue is considered low.

4.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Surveillance Procedures for performing charcoal filter testing have been updated to specify overnight shipping for charcoal samples and to request immediate feedback from vendors if the test fails. Other actions are being taken in accordance with the station's corrective action program.

I

5.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

No previous similar occurrences.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].