Letter Sequence Request |
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Results
Other: ML13063A012, ML13070A006, ML13242A011, ML13242A014, ML13338A433, ML13357A398, ML14006A159, ML14069A011, ML14069A013, ML14176A952, ML14275A017
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MONTHYEARML13063A0122013-02-28028 February 2013 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) Project stage: Other ML13070A0062013-02-28028 February 2013 Overall Integrated Plan Regarding Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) Project stage: Other ML13126A2062013-04-30030 April 2013 Supplement to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order EA-12-049) Project stage: Supplement ML13175A2422013-06-26026 June 2013 Request for Additional Information Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumental Project stage: RAI ML13213A0152013-07-26026 July 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) Project stage: Response to RAI ML13242A0112013-08-23023 August 2013 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order No. EA-12-049) Project stage: Other ML13242A0142013-08-23023 August 2013 Connecticut, Inc. & Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3 Six-Month Status Report in Response to Letter Dated March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Project stage: Other ML13281A8042013-10-0202 October 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Changes to Technical Specification 3/4.7.5, Ultimate Heat Sink Project stage: Response to RAI 05000423/LER-2013-007, Reactor Trip on Low-Low Steam Generator Level2013-10-0707 October 2013 Reactor Trip on Low-Low Steam Generator Level Project stage: Request ML13291A1152013-10-29029 October 2013 Interim Staff Evaluation and Request for Additional Information Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Implementation of Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (TAC Nos. MF0838 and MF0839 Project stage: RAI 05000336/LER-2013-004, Unit 2 Regarding Reactor Trip While Backwashing D Waterbox2013-12-19019 December 2013 Unit 2 Regarding Reactor Trip While Backwashing D Waterbox Project stage: Request ML14006A1592014-01-0808 January 2014 Mega-Tech Services, LLC Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Millstone Power Station, Unit 3, TAC No.: MF0859 Project stage: Other ML13357A3982014-01-24024 January 2014 Mega-Tech Services, LLC Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Milestone Power Station, Unit 2, TAC No.: MF0858 Project stage: Other ML13338A4332014-01-31031 January 2014 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 (Mitigation Strategies) Project stage: Other ML14069A0132014-02-28028 February 2014 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) Project stage: Other ML14069A0112014-02-28028 February 2014 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12. 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) Project stage: Other ML14119A1872014-04-23023 April 2014 Supplement to License Amendment Request for Changes to Technical Specification 3/4.7.5, Ultimate Heat Sink Project stage: Supplement ML14154A0912014-05-28028 May 2014 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Changes to Technical Specification 3/4.7.5, Ultimate Heat Sink Project stage: Response to RAI ML14176A9522014-07-0202 July 2014 Plan for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 Project stage: Other ML14275A0172014-11-17017 November 2014 Report for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 Project stage: Other 2013-08-23
[Table View] |
LER-2013-004, Unit 2 Regarding Reactor Trip While Backwashing D Waterbox |
| Event date: |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B), System Actuation |
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| 3362013004R00 - NRC Website |
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text
Dominionl Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Rope Ferry Rd., Waterford, CT 06385 Mailing Address: P.O. Box 128 Warerford, CT 06385 doons.co DEC 19 2013 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial No.
MPS Lic/LES Docket No.
License No.13-656 RO 50-336 DPR-65 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT. INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2013-004-00 REACTOR TRIP WHILE BACKWASHING D WATERBOX This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2013-004-00 documenting an event that occurred at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 on November 9, 2013. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(IV)(A).
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. William D. Bartron at (860) 444-4301.
Sincerely,
/Stephe rE. Sca e Site Vice President - Millstone Attachments: 1 Commitments made in this letter: None
Serial No.13-656 Docket No. 50-336 Licensee Event Report 2013-004-00 Page 2 of 2 cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 2100 Renaissance Blvd, Suite 100 King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 J. S. Kim Project Manager - Millstone Power Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 08 C2A Rockville, MD 20852-2738 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Millstone Power Station
Serial No.13-656 Docket No. 50-336 Licensee Event Report 2013-004-00 ATTACHMENT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2013-004-00 MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2016 (10/2010)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor.
digits/characters for each block) and a person is not required to respond to. the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Millstone Power Station - Unit 2 05000336 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Reactor Trip While Backwashing D Waterbox
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER REV MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 11 09 2013 2013-004-00 12 19 2013 05000
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR Check all that apply)
- 9. OPERATING MODE 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71 (a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71 (a)(5) 095 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in
- 1.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On November 9, 2013, at 1514, Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) experienced a turbine trip and an automatic reactor trip from 95% power MODE 1 due to loss of condenser vacuum.
The Unit was in the process of condenser backwashing operations in accordance with plant procedures. The loss of condenser vacuum was due to unexpected pump ramp-down of the 'C' circulating water pump (CWP) when the 'D' CWP was secured as required by procedure. This resulted in both CWPs being secured in the 'B' condenser. This caused the condenser vacuum to drop resulting in a turbine trip which immediately caused the reactor trip breakers to open. All the control rods inserted into the reactor core. Reactor coolant (RCS) and main steam systems responded as expected. There were no indications of safety valve actuation. Steam generator (SG) pressures were maintained below 920 psia. RCS temperature response was as expected post trip and returned to its nominal no-load Tcold of 532 degrees F. An auxiliary feedwater (AFW) automatic start occurred post trip, as expected and SG water level was recovered. All safety systems functioned as required.
This event is being reported per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). Actuations of the reactor protection system and the AFW system are reportable under this paragraph.
- 2.
CAUSE
Post trip troubleshooting revealed that the direct cause of the event was the MPS2 'C' CWP ramped off due to failure of contacts on a time-delay relay to deenergize as designed. This relay is a pump permissive relay designed to de-energize when the 'D' CWP is fully secured.
- 3.
ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
The operating crew responded to the reactor trip by completing EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions, and entering EOP 2526 Reactor Trip Recovery. The AFW system started in response to low steam generator level as designed.
All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. With the 'A' and 'B' CWPs still running, condenser vacuum remained adequate for operation of the condenser dump valves following the reactor trip. Both main and auxiliary feedwater provided makeup to the SGs.
Based on the above discussion, there were no safety consequences for the event.
4. CORRECTIVE ACTION
The defective relay was replaced. Additional corrective actions are being taken in accordance with the station's corrective action program.
- 5.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
Similar events are documented in the following LERs:
0 MPS2 LER 2010-003-00, Reactor Trip on Low Condenser Vacuum.
I
- 6.
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are Circulating Water System - SG Circulating Water Pump -SG, P Main Condenser - COND Reactor Protection System - JC Reactor Trip Breakers -JC, BKR Reactor Coolant System - AB Main Steam System - SB Auxiliary Feedwater System - BA I
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| 05000423/LER-2013-001, Regarding Improperly Secured Enclosure Caused Inoperability of Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter | Regarding Improperly Secured Enclosure Caused Inoperability of Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2013-001, Regarding Historical Acoustic Monitor Channel Check Discovered to Have Not Met Acceptance Criteria | Regarding Historical Acoustic Monitor Channel Check Discovered to Have Not Met Acceptance Criteria | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2013-002, Regarding Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump HELB Door Left Open During Surveillance Test | Regarding Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump HELB Door Left Open During Surveillance Test | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000423/LER-2013-002, Regarding Secondary Containment Boundary Breach Could Have Prevented Safety Function | Regarding Secondary Containment Boundary Breach Could Have Prevented Safety Function | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2013-003, Regarding Postulated DC Ammeter Circuit Hot Shorts | Regarding Postulated DC Ammeter Circuit Hot Shorts | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000336/LER-2013-004, Unit 2 Regarding Reactor Trip While Backwashing D Waterbox | Unit 2 Regarding Reactor Trip While Backwashing D Waterbox | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000423/LER-2013-004, Regarding Failed Surveillance Test of a Train Control Room Emergency Filtration System | Regarding Failed Surveillance Test of a Train Control Room Emergency Filtration System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000423/LER-2013-005, Regarding Loss of Containment Integrity Due to Failed Airlock | Regarding Loss of Containment Integrity Due to Failed Airlock | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000423/LER-2013-007, Reactor Trip on Low-Low Steam Generator Level | Reactor Trip on Low-Low Steam Generator Level | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000423/LER-2013-009, Regarding Secondary Containment Boundary Breach Could Have Prevented Safety Function | Regarding Secondary Containment Boundary Breach Could Have Prevented Safety Function | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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