05000413/LER-2010-003, Regarding Technical Specification Violation Due to Failure to Perform Required Actions Following Solid State Protection System Relay Latch Failure
| ML102310504 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/2010 |
| From: | Morris J Duke Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 10-003-00 | |
| Download: ML102310504 (8) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 4132010003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PDuke DEnergy JAMES R. MORRIS Vice President Duke Energy Corporation Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 803-701-4251 803-701-3221 fax July 19, 2010 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke)
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-413 Licensee Event Report 413/2010-003 Attached is Licensee Event Report 413/2010-003, Revision 0 entitled, "Technical Specification Violation Due to Failure to Perform Required Actions Following Solid State Protection. System Relay Latch Failure".
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter or its attachment.
This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public. If there are any questions on this report, please contact A.F. Driver at (803) 701-3445.
Sincerely, Ve*s R. Morri~s AFD/s Attachment www. duke-energy. com
Document Control Desk Page 2 July 19, 2010 xc (with attachment):
L.A. Reyes Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 J.H. Thompson (addressee only)
NRC Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 8-G9A -
11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G.A. Hutto, III
- NRC Senior Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station INPO Records Center 700 Galleria Place Atlanta, GA 30339-5957
Abstract
On April 30, 2010, Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
Instrumentation" (retroactive) was violated for Unit 1. The violation occurred following the identification of SSPS Train 1A relay K625 to not latch properly when energized during quarterly Auxiliary Safeguards Testing.
Plant personnel did not recognize that the latching mechanism associated with the K625 relay affected the Train 1A manual actuation feature for Phase B Containment Isolation. On May 20, 2010, it was identified that the latching mechanism affected the manual actuation feature required per TS 3.3.2, Condition B, Table 3.3.2-1 Function 3.b.1, which was not identified on April 30th. As a result of not identifying that the manual actuation feature was not capable of meeting its function as required by TS, the associated Required Actions were not completed for the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO). Train 1A of manual Phase B Containment Isolation was subsequently declared inoperable on May 20, 2010 at 13:59.
Planned corrective actions include revising the administrative procedure governing the operability process to require the originator, reviewer, and approver to ensure applicable TS Surveillance Requirements are listed and evaluated.
This event only affected the operability of one train of the Manual Phase B Containment Isolation Function (Train 1A). The automatic actuation function for Phase B Containment Isolation was not affected by the failure of the K625 relay latching mechanism. The health and safety of the public were not adversely affected by this event.
NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A,) (17)
- 4. Licensed personnel will perform an extent of condition review of TSAIL models to verify accuracy against plant design and licensing basis documents. Models will be adjusted based on these reviews.
There are no NRC commitments contained in this LER.
SAFETY ANALYSIS
This event was analyzed using the Duke Catawba Revision 3a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The components affected due to the failure of the K625 relay to latch were HSS fan Train 1A, valves 1NW13A and 1NW46A, and ARS fan Train 1A. (Note: Only the ARS fan is modeled in the PRA. The remaining components were determined to have no impact to Core Damage Frequency (CDF) or Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) and were therefore excluded from the model.) The PRA model was solved with the ARS fan assumed unavailable.
The Incremental Conditional Core Damage Probability (ICCDP) associated with this event was determined to be less than 1 E-06. -The Incremental Conditional Large Early Release, Probability (ICLERP) associated with this event was determined to be less than 1 E-07.
Therefore, there was no safety significance to this event and the health and safety of the public were not adversely affected.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Within the previous three years, there have been no LER events involving the failure to perform associated TS Required Actions based upon an incorrect operability determination. This event is therefore considered to be non-recurring. There has been a recently identified trend of LER events involving inadequate application of TS requirements at Catawba. This trend has been evaluated under the Corrective Action Program and actions are being taken in response.
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [EIIS: XX]. This event is not considered reportable to the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) program.
This event is not considered to constitute a Safety System Functional Failure. This event only affected the operability of one train of the Manual Phase B Containment Isolation Function (Train 1A).
The automatic actuation function for Phase B Containment Isolation was not affected by the failure of the K625 relay latching mechanism. There was no release of radioactive material, radiation overexposure, or personnel injury associated with the event described in this LER.