05000413/LER-2003-002, Loss of Safety Function Due to Inoperability of the 2B Diesel Generator Upon Loss of Vital Inverter 2EID with the 2A Diesel Generator Inoperable
| ML031060333 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/2003 |
| From: | Gordon Peterson Duke Power Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 03-002-00 | |
| Download: ML031060333 (14) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 4132003002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PDuke IPower.
A Duke Energy Company GARY R. PETERSON Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station Duke Power CN01 VP / 4800 Concord Rd York, SC 29745 803 831 4251 803 831 3221 fax grpeters@duke-energy corn April 9, 2003 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION:
Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
Duke Energy Corporation Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket Nos. 50-413 Licensee Event Report 413/03-002 Revision 0 Loss of Safety Function due to Inoperability of the 2B Diesel Generator upon Loss of Vital Inverter 2EID with the 2A Diesel Generator Inoperable Attached please find Licensee Event Report 413/03-002 Revision 0, entitled "Loss of Safety Function due to Inoperability of the 2B Diesel Generator upon Loss of Vital Inverter 2EID with the 2A Diesel Generator Inoperable."
This Licensee Event Report does not contain any regulatory
commitments
This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
Questions regarding this Licensee Event Report should be directed to R. D. Hart at (803) 831-3622.
Sincerely, G. R. Peterson Attachment www.duke-energy corn
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 9, 2003 Page 2 xc:
L. A. Reyes U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 R. E. Martin (addressee only)
NRC Senior Project Manager (MNS/CNS)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 08-G9 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E. F. Guthrie Senior Resident Inspector (CNS)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Catawba Nuclear Site INPO Records Center 700 Galleria Place Atlanta, GA 30339-5957
Abstract
At 0945 on February 12, 2003 Unit 2 experienced a loss of vital inverter 2EID resulting in a loss of power to channel IV 120 VAC panel board 2ERPD.
2ERPD provides power to support equipment for the 2B diesel generator (DG).
This resulted in declaring the 2B DG inoperable.
The 2A DG had been previously taken out of service for routine maintenance.
This resulted in both DGs on Unit 2 being declared inoperable.
This also resulted in both the 2A and 2B nuclear service water system (RN) pumps being inoperable.
RN is a shared system between Unit 2 and Unit 1.
TS 3.7.8 does not provide any actions for two RN pumps being inoperable so, both-Units entered TS 3.0.3.
Power was restored to 2ERPD at 1028 when the alternate source, 2VRD, was manually aligned to provide power to 2ERPD, which allowed both units to exit TS 3.0.3.
The cause of the 2EID failure on February 12, 2003 is a fabrication deficiency in choke CH804.
The failed choke CH804 was replaced and the inverter aligned to supply power to 2ERPD.
The vital inverters for both units at Catawba are being replaced with new models.
The health and safety of the public was not affected.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)
(if more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) voltage regulation, and current limiting.
The output is controlled without any feedback circuitry to the semiconductor bridge.
The voltage regulation provided by the CVT is totally magnetic and requires no electronics.
The filter components in the CVT are designated as choke CH804 and transformer TX803.
The Unit 2 vital inverters were manufactured in the late 1970's, and have been installed in the plant and energized since about 1984.
Studies performed by EPRI/NMAC have concluded that the failure rate of inverters rises rapidly after 15 years of age.
For this reason, a decision was made to replace the existing inverters.
There are no more choke CH804's in stock at Catawba under stock code 54002, which is the stock code of the CH804 installed on September 11, 2002.
This is the stock code for part number SCI-T-851B, which is the original part number for CH804 in a 15 KVA inverter.
A stock code 54002 choke would have a manufacture date in the 1980's.
Replacement CH804's are now ordered under part number 80-310851-90, also for a 15 KVA inverter only.
These carry stock code 54008.
There is not a potential to install the old part number choke manufactured in the 1980's again.
Several vital inverters have original CH804's installed, or have a replacement CH804 which is also from the 1980's manufacture period.
Since these CH804's have been in service for quite a while, it does not appear that a fabrication defect exists in these.
Ongoing monthly thermography surveys and visual observations of vital inverters will aid in identifying a degrading device, unless the failure is fairly rapid.
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [EIIS: XX].
This event did involve an equipment failure and is reportable to the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) program.
Although the safety impact of this event was minimal, this condition met the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) and therefore will be recorded under the NRC Performance Indicators for Unit 1 and Unit 2 as a Safety System Functional Failure.
There were no releases of radioactive materials, radiation exposures or personnel injuries associated with this event Catawba.Nuclear Station LER 413/03-002-00 PIP C-03-00714 ENCLOSURE 1 Signature Sheet
- 0)
G)
Prepared By:
Reviewed By:,59!00
,011
. F"k.,4eX
Date:
e-7-0o Date:
(
3 Date:
_- 7-__3 Date:
Approved By:y Date:
Date: LILZoL3
ENCLOSURES:
- 1. Safety Review Signature Sheet
- 2. References
- 3. Corrective Action Schedule
- 4. Cause Code Summary
- 5. Personnel Contacted
Catawba-.Nuclear Station LER 413/03-002-00 PIP C-03-00714 ENCLOSURE 2 REFERENCES
- 1. LER 413-03-002-00
- 2. PIP C-03-00714
- 3. PIP C-03-01383
- 4. UFSAR Section 9.4.4, Diesel Building Ventilation
- 5. UFSAR Section 7.6.8, Diesel Building Ventilation System Instrumentation and Controls
- 6. Catawba TS 3.7.8, 3.8.1, 3.8.7, & 3.8.9 and associated Bases
- 7. AP/2/A/5500/029, Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power
- 8. OP/2/A/6350/008, 125 VDC/120 VAC Vital Instrument and Control Power System
- 9. CNS-1579.VD-00-0001, Diesel Building Ventilation System(VD) DBD 10.CNS-1579.RN-00-0001, Nuclear Service Water System (RN) DBD ll.CNS-106.01-EPG-0001, 120VAC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System (EPG) DBD 12.W/O# 98576574 ENCLOSURE 3 CORRECTIVE ACTION SCHEDULE Corrective Person(s)
Person(s)
Due Date Action Contacted Assigned See PIP C-03-00714
Catawba. Nuclear Station LER 413/03-002-00 PIP C-03-00714 ENCLOSURE 4 CAUSE CODE ASSIGNMENT SHEET CAUSE CODE:
See PIP C-03-00714 ENCLOSURE 5 PERSONNEL CONTACTED Personnel Contacted:
Richard L. White Brian M. Haynes Ray A. Kayler, Jr.
Michael J.
Barrett Tom Baumgardner