05000413/FIN-2010003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | On April 30, 2010, during testing of the phase B isolation portion of Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS), relay K625 in the A train failed to latch. The licensee completed an immediate determination of operability and concluded that the latching function of the relay did not affect the automatic actuation of the phase B isolation function and declared the system operable following completion of testing. Subsequently, on May 20, 2010, as part of the cause evaluation of the relay issue, Catawba engineering determined that the A train of manual initiation of phase B isolation was affected by the relay latching failure and therefore inoperable. TS Table 3.3.2-1, Section 3.b., required entry into TS 3.3.2, Condition B. At this time, the licensee entered the TS action statement and replaced and tested relay K625 within the allowed outage time. TS 3.3.2 Condition B requires that with one channel or train of the ESFAS Instrumentation inoperable, the channel or train must be restored to operable within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in Mode 3 in 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> and be in Mode 5 in 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />. Contrary to the above, from April 30, 2010, to May 20, 2010, the A train of ESFAS phase B isolation function was inoperable for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and the unit was not in mode 3 in 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> or mode 5 in 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), as the A train automatic actuation function of containment isolation which is credited in accident analysis remained operable and available. This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-10-2566. |
| Site: | Catawba  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000413/2010003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Bartley R Rodriguez R Cureton A Hutto |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Catawba - IR 05000413/2010003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Catawba) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Catawba)
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