05000413/FIN-2008002-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Identify an Inoperable Cracws Chiller Prior to Removing the Remaining Chiller from Service Placed Both Units in TS 3.0.3 for Approximately 110 Minutes |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the failure to adequately establish and implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 1.b, Administrative Procedures. Specifically, the licensed operators in the main control room and work control center failed to identify that the A Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable prior to removing the remaining chiller from service for testing. This placed both Catawba units in Technical Specification 3.0.3 for approximately 110 minutes without any of the required actions being taken. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers provide protection from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. While the Control Room Area Ventilation System (CRAVS) would have remained operable in terms of filtering air in the areas it services, without chilled water providing cooling, operators would have had to bypass the filtered air paths using Abnormal Operating Procedure (AP) guidance in order to maintain area temperatures at values needed to ensure equipment in the areas remained operable over time. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of Inspection Manual 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process. The issue would only become evident if the 2A diesel generator failed to re-energize the 2A 4.16kV vital bus following a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event with the A chiller control power aligned to the 2A bus and the length of time available before the AP would have had to be entered and the filtered air flow paths bypassed. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to effectively follow multiple station procedures to ensure redundant CRACWS chillers were not removed from service, resulting in a potential loss of chilled water cooling for areas supplied by the CRAVS H.4.b]. This issue has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-07-7073 |
| Site: | Catawba  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000413/2008002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Weaver A Sabisch G Williams J Quinone-Navarro C Peabody |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - Catawba - IR 05000413/2008002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Catawba) @ 2008Q1
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||