05000413/FIN-2007007-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | The Licensees Original Associated Circuits Analysis Failed to Identify Circuits Whose Failure Could Prevent the Proper Performance of SSD Equipment in Fire Areas 12, 13, 36 and 37 |
| Description | Operating License Condition 2.C.(5), for Units 1 and 2, requires that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved FPP as described in the UFSAR, as amended, for the facility and as approved in the SER through Supplement 5. BTP CMEB 9.5-1, which incorporated the guidance of Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1 and the technical requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, established the regulatory and licensing requirements for the FPP at CNS. The CNS FPP was reviewed against and approved for conformance with BTP CMEB 9.5-1 in the SER through Supplement 5. BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.5.b.1, requires that fire protection features be provided that are capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) is free from fire damage. BTP CMEB 9.5- 1, Item C.5.b.2 requires one redundant train to be protected from fire damage by one of three specified methods. Proper coordination and selective tripping of fuses and breakers on associated circuits is an acceptable method for meeting the requirements. Contrary to the above, on May 17, 2007, the licensee identified train B cables (CA581 and IRE761) located in train B Fire Areas with associated breakers that were not coordinated from a selective tripping standpoint. As a consequence, a fire-induced failure of associated circuits CA581 (in the AFW pump turbine control panel room) or IRE761 (in the 577 elevation train A electrical penetration room) could result in the loss of SSD power sources EDF or EDP, respectively. This condition has existed since original construction. This issue was entered into the licensees CAP as PIP C-07- 02458. No enforcement action is required for the above noncompliance because pursuant to the Commissions Enforcement Policy and NRC Manual Chapter 0305, under certain conditions fire protection findings at nuclear power plants that transition their licensing bases to 10 CFR 50.48(c) are eligible for enforcement and reactor oversight process (ROP) discretion. The Enforcement Policy and ROP also state that the finding must not be evaluated as Red. Because the licensee committed, prior to December 31, 2005, to adopt NFPA 805 and change their fire protection licensing bases to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c), the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion for this issue in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48). Specifically, this issue was licensee identified as a result of its initiative to adopt NFPA 805, it was entered into the licensees corrective action program and will be corrected, was not likely to have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts, was not willful, and was not associated with a finding of high safety significance. The licensee entered this issue in their CAP under PIP C-07-02458 and implemented 1-hour roving fire watches as compensatory measures in the FAs. |
| Site: | Catawba  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000413/2007007 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2007 (2007Q3) |
| Type: | Violation: Severity level Enforcement Discretion |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Merriweather R Rodriguez G Wiseman R Fanner D Merzke |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Catawba - IR 05000413/2007007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Catawba) @ 2007Q3
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