05000397/LER-2014-003
| 5-12-2014 | == FACILITY NAME ==
M. Hedges
Contents
13. COMPUTE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTCAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- FACTURER REPORTABLETO EPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENTMANU- FACTURERREPORTABLETO EFIX14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED0 YES (ft yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) .:. NO 14. EXPEL MONTH DAY r YEAR SUBMISSIONDAT3 ., .. . 4. ABSTRACT (Limit to I it spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten On March 12, 2014, it was identified that thr: manhole covers (E10, El 1, and E 15) for vaults containing 4160 volt electric cables were missing the hold down bolts. The hold down bolts are required as part of the tornado missile barrier for the manhole cover for the underground electric vault. It was later determined that the hold down bolts for manhole cover E 1 / (Division 2 Service Water) had been identified as missing since September 6, 2013. When the bolts were identified as missing on September 6, 2013, the manhole cover and bolts were not recognized as a tornado missile barrier; because this information was not available in routinely used databases and procedures. No compensatory action was taken until March 12, 2014, when large concrete blocks were placed on top of the manholes to prevent the covers from potential removal in the event of a tornado. The degraded missile barrier is considered to have rendered the Division 2 Service Water system inoperable from September 6, 2013, to March 12, 2014. This is reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. 26158 R6 NRC Form 366 (01-2C14) APPROVED DV ON& NO. 31104104 - UMW: 01l3I/2017 Elrodad Laden par respire lo comply sib Ilia mandelory colecim request P3 hours. Fisporbd lessors Men* u, ncorporbsd Mb be loansesa process end lid bad 10 ndualry. 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EVENT DESCRIPTIONOn March 12, 2014, it was identified that three manhole covers (E10, El 1, and E 15) for vaults containing 4160 volt electric cables [CBI.) were missing the hold down bolts. The electric cables in vaults El0 and Eli support the Division 2 Service Water (BI] system. The electric cables in vaults EIS s the Division 3 Service Water system. The hold down bolts are required as part of the tornado missile barrier for the manhole cover for the underground electric vault. It was later determined that the hold down bolts for manhole cover Ell (Division 2 Service Water) had been identified as missing in two condition reports on September 8, 2013, and again on December 3, 2013. When Operations performed an immediate operability determination for the September and December 2013 condition reports, the manhole cover and bolts were not recognized as a tornado missile barrier; therefore, no compensatory action was taken until March 12, 2014. The degraded missile barrier is considered to have rendered the Division 2 Service Water system inoperable from September 6, 2013, to March 12, 2014. This is reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONIt was verified through the Weather Service that no tornados were predicted for our area in the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Large concrete blocks were placed over the manhole covers on March 12, 2014, to prevent the cover from lifting in the event of a tornado. The information fields in the master equipment list for the applicable manhole covers were completed identifying them as a tornado missile barrier. CAUSEThe information in this section is based on the preliminary results of a root cause evaluation. If any significant changes in the cause or corrective actions are made in the final evaluation, a supplement will be submitted for this report. The direct cause for the missing hold down bolts was not determined. The root cause of the failure to recognize the manhole cover as a tornado barrier was that station procedures that implement the process to establish quality classifications for safety-related systems, structures, and components (SSCs) did not ensure accurate information was available in a timely manner for these components. There are multiple methods available for determining the safety significance of a degraded component; however., the computerized master equipment list is typically the preferred method. The equipment plant numbers (EPNs) for the manhole covers had been entered into master equipment list in 2012, but no action was taken to complete the remaining data fields for the components to kientify that the manhole covers fulfilled a tornado barrier function, and have the information verified and approved. The master equipment list that station personnel used identified these manhole covers as nonsafety-related. 26158A A3 NA'; FORM 366A 01-"eC14) IL LER NUMENEPI 5 PAGE 2. DOCKET 1. FACILITY NAME Columbia Generating Station YEAR OF 3 A 0014 - 003 -0 NRC FORM014014) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTINUATION SHEETIn the immediate rability determination process for the two Condition Reports in 2013, Operations personnel did not have information readily available to them to determine that the manhole cover was a tornado missile barrier. Most plant personnel, including Operations, did not recognize that the information in the computer master equipment list for the manhole covers was not at an approved status and should not be used. The manhole covers did not have any label indicating that it was a tornado missile barrier. Plant drawings did not identify the manhole covers as tornado missile barriers. Additionally, the station barrier impairment procedure did not list the manhole covers as a tornado missile barrier. FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTIONWork requests were initiated to repair/replace the missing bolts for the manhole covers. Revise Engineering procedures to provide clear direction to establish Quality Classifications for safety-related SSCs within the Master Equipment List within a specific time frame. Ensure that procedures include timeliness requirements for establishing and upgrading/downgrading EPNs for installed plant equipment. Apply a marking on the manhole covers that identify these covers as a tornado missile barrier. Revise the station barrier impairment procedure to identify manhole covers as a tornado missile barrier. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCESNo actual tornados occurred during the time of interest. The Division 2 Service Water system remained capable of fulfilling its safety function during this time period. Additionally, at least one other division of Service Water was available during this time period (September 6, 2013 to March 12, 2014) to be able to fulfill the safety function; therefore, the actual safety consequence of this issue was minimal. SIMILAR EVENTSThere have been no similar events at Columbia Generating Station in the last three years. ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (ENS) INFORMATION CODES EIIS s a are bracketed 'Mere applicable in the narrative. NERGY.!‘‘ORT1:1--"T er 914) |
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| Columbia Generating Station | |
| Event date: | 3-12-2014 |
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| Report date: | 5-12-2014 |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3972014003R00 - NRC Website | |
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