05000390/LER-2016-002, Regarding Technical Specification Action Not Met for Inoperable Containment Isolation Valve
| ML16125A056 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/2016 |
| From: | Simmons P Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 16-002-00 | |
| Download: ML16125A056 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 3902016002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
m Tennessee Valley Authority, Post OfficeBox 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381 May 4, 2016 10CFR 50.73 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 390/2016-002-00, Technical Specification Action Not Met for Inoperable Containment Isolation Valve This submittal provides Licensee Event Report (LER) 390/2016-002-00. This LER provides details concerning a failure to isolate an inoperable containment penetration in the time required by Technical Specification 3.6.3. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
Please direct any questions concerning this matter to Gordon Arent, WEN Licensing Director, at (423) 365-2004.
Respectfully, Paul Simmons Site Vice President Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Enclosure cc: See Page 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 May 4, 2016 cc (Enclosure):
NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
NRC FORM (11-2015) 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respondto, the infomiation collection.
- 1. FACILITY NAME Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000390
- 3. PAGE 1
OF 5
- 4. TITLE Technical Specification Action Not Met for Inoperable Containment Isolation Valve
- 5. EVENT DATE MONTH DAY YEAR 03 05 2016
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 10. POWER LEVEL 100
- 6. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.
2016 002 00
- 7. REPORT DATE MONTH DAY YEAR 05 04 2016
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME N/A FACILITY NAME N/A DOCKET NUMBER N/A DOCKET NUMBER N/A
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check ali that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(0(1 )(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(0(1 )(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(0(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 73.77(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 73.77(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
M 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 1 1 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in YEAR 2016 Page 3 of 5 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to. the information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 002 REV NO.
00 F.
Method of discovery of each Component or System Failure or Procedural Error
Whilea component issue was involved in this report, itdid not cause the condition prohibited by Technical Specifications G.
Failure Mode and Effect of Each Failed Component While a leak on valve 1-FCV-61-122 caused the plant to enter TS 3.6.3 Condition A, it was not the cause of personnel failing to comply with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
H.
Operator Actions
Upon receiving clarification of the expectations associated with the TS 3.6.3 Note, operations properly isolated the impacted penetration.
I.
Automatically and Manually Initiated Safety System Responses
There were no automatic or manual system responses associated with this event.
III.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
A.
The cause of each component or system failure or personnel error, if known.
This event was the result of an incorrect understanding of how to comply with the Note associated with TS 3.6.3.
B. The cause{s) and circumstances for each human performance related root cause.
The cause of this event was an incorrect understanding of how to comply with the Note associated with TS 3.6.3.
IV.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT
TS LCO 3.6.3 Condition A, Containment Isolation valves, required the penetration associated with valve 1-FCV-61-122 to be isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Note 1 associated with TS 3.6.3 allows for a penetration flow path to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls, such as to perform testing after maintenance. Operations stationed a dedicated operator in accordance with TS LCO 3.6.3 Note 1, but did not isolate the valve. This was based on an understanding that by invoking Note 1 with a dedicated operator stationed to isolate the flowpath that this met the intent of shutting the valve for the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> time requirement for the action statement of the LCO. Upon being informed by site licensing that this reading of the TS Note was incorrect, the valve was isolated.
V.
ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
A.
Availability of systems or components that could have performed the same function as the components and systems that failed during the event There were no safety system failures associated during this event. In the event a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) had occurred during the inoperability of valve 1-FCV-61-122, the remaining containment isolation valve (1-FCV-61-110) for this penetration was capable of closing and isolating this penetration.
B.
For events that occurred when the reactor was shut down, availability of systems or components needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident Not applicable.
C.
For failure that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, an estimate of the elapsed time from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service Not applicable.
VI.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
This event was entered into the Tennessee Valley Authority Corrective Action Program and is being tracked under condition report 1146157.
A.
Immediate Corrective Actions
Upon identifying the correct requirements to implement TS 3.6.3 Condition A, the impacted penetration was properly isolated.
B.
Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence A shift order defining the correct response when entering TS 3.6.3 Condition A was provided to the operating staff. This issue will be a topic of future operations training.
VII.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A.
Previous similar events at the same plant This LER involves an incorrect understanding by operations personnel in how to apply Technical Specification requirements. No similar event was identified with the same causal basis.
B.
Additional Information
None.
VIII.
C.
Safety System Functional Failure Consideration This condition did not result in a safety system functional failure.
D. Scrams with Complications Consideration There was no scram associated with this report.
COMMITMENTS
None.
I.
PLANT OPERATING CONDITIONS BEFORE THE EVENT
Watts Bar NuclearPlant (WBN) Unit 1 was in Mode1 at 100 percent rated thermal power(RTP).
II.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
A.
Event On March 5, 2016, at 1512 Eastern Standard Time (EST), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit1 entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, Condition A for a containment isolation valve associated with the ice condenser glycol system {EIIS:BC} being inoperable. During a containment walkdown, leakage was found on valve 1-FCV-61-122, Glycol Cooled Floor Return Header Isolation {EIIS:FCV} and the valve was declared inoperable. TS 3.6.3 Condition A requires that a penetration flow path with one containment isolation valve inoperable to be isolated by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The penetration associated with this containment isolation valve was not isolated until 2113 EST on March 5, 2016.
Because the action specified by TS 3.6.3 was not completed within four hours, this condition is reportable as an operation or condition prohibited by TS per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
B.
Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event No inoperable structures, components, or systems contributed to this event.
C.
Dates and Approximate Times of Occurrences
Date Time Event 3/05/16 1512 EST 3/05/16 1935 EST 3/05/16 2113 EST 3/05/16 2142 EST 1-FCV-61-122, Glycol Cooled Floor Return Header Isolation declared inoperable.
Licensing requested to verify invoking the TS LCO 3.6.3 note allowing the CIV path to remain open with administrative controls in place and determine acceptable time frame for "intermittent."
1-FCV-61-110 was closed and deactivated, isolating the penetration flowpath.
Licensing formal interpretation of TS 3.6.3 compliance entered into operating logs.
D.
Manufacturer and Model Number of Components that Failed While a leak on valve 1-FCV-61-122 caused the plant to enter TS 3.6.3 Condition A, it was not the cause of personnel failing to comply with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
E.
Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected
There were no systems or secondary functions affected by this event.
YEAR 2016 Page 3 of 5 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to. the information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 002 REV NO.
00 F.
Method of discovery of each Component or System Failure or Procedural Error
Whilea component issue was involved in this report, itdid not cause the condition prohibited by Technical Specifications G.
Failure Mode and Effect of Each Failed Component While a leak on valve 1-FCV-61-122 caused the plant to enter TS 3.6.3 Condition A, it was not the cause of personnel failing to comply with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
H.
Operator Actions
Upon receiving clarification of the expectations associated with the TS 3.6.3 Note, operations properly isolated the impacted penetration.
I.
Automatically and Manually Initiated Safety System Responses
There were no automatic or manual system responses associated with this event.
III.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
A.
The cause of each component or system failure or personnel error, if known.
This event was the result of an incorrect understanding of how to comply with the Note associated with TS 3.6.3.
B. The cause{s) and circumstances for each human performance related root cause.
The cause of this event was an incorrect understanding of how to comply with the Note associated with TS 3.6.3.
IV.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT
TS LCO 3.6.3 Condition A, Containment Isolation valves, required the penetration associated with valve 1-FCV-61-122 to be isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Note 1 associated with TS 3.6.3 allows for a penetration flow path to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls, such as to perform testing after maintenance. Operations stationed a dedicated operator in accordance with TS LCO 3.6.3 Note 1, but did not isolate the valve. This was based on an understanding that by invoking Note 1 with a dedicated operator stationed to isolate the flowpath that this met the intent of shutting the valve for the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> time requirement for the action statement of the LCO. Upon being informed by site licensing that this reading of the TS Note was incorrect, the valve was isolated.
V.
ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
A.
Availability of systems or components that could have performed the same function as the components and systems that failed during the event There were no safety system failures associated during this event. In the event a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) had occurred during the inoperability of valve 1-FCV-61-122, the remaining containment isolation valve (1-FCV-61-110) for this penetration was capable of closing and isolating this penetration.
B.
For events that occurred when the reactor was shut down, availability of systems or components needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident Not applicable.
C.
For failure that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, an estimate of the elapsed time from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service Not applicable.
VI.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
This event was entered into the Tennessee Valley Authority Corrective Action Program and is being tracked under condition report 1146157.
A.
Immediate Corrective Actions
Upon identifying the correct requirements to implement TS 3.6.3 Condition A, the impacted penetration was properly isolated.
B.
Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence A shift order defining the correct response when entering TS 3.6.3 Condition A was provided to the operating staff. This issue will be a topic of future operations training.
VII.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A.
Previous similar events at the same plant This LER involves an incorrect understanding by operations personnel in how to apply Technical Specification requirements. No similar event was identified with the same causal basis.
B.
Additional Information
None.
VIII.
C.
Safety System Functional Failure Consideration This condition did not result in a safety system functional failure.
D. Scrams with Complications Consideration There was no scram associated with this report.
COMMITMENTS
None.YEAR 2016 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 002 REV NO.
00