05000387/LER-2012-004, Regarding Unit 1 Secondary Containment TS 3.6.4.2 Combined LCO Time Exceeded on Two Occasions When the Primary Containment N2 Spectacle Flange Was Rotated in the Open Position
| ML12179A275 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna |
| Issue date: | 06/26/2012 |
| From: | Helsel J Susquehanna |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| PLA-6877 LER 12-004-00 | |
| Download: ML12179A275 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| 3872012004R00 - NRC Website | |
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Jeffrey M. Helsel Nuclear Plant Manager
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~, TM U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Stop OP1-17 Washington, DC 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387/2012-004-00 LICENSE NO. NPF-14 PLA-6877 Docket No 50-387 Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-387/2012-004-00. This event was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
On April27, 2012, it was determined that PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL) failed to enter Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves" Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) when the primary containment nitrogen makeup line spectacle flange ( 1 S21 04) was rotated in the open position in Modes 1, 2 and 3. A review of the Unit 1 control room logs for the past three years identified that on two occasions in 2011 (January 28, 2011 and June 25, 2011) the Unit 1 spectacle flange was open for greater than the combined completion times forTS 3.6.4.2,
, Condition C.1 and D.1 (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, respectively) of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. As a result, these events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of these events.
No commitments were identified in this submittal.
Attachment: LER 50-387/2012-004-000 Copy:
NRC Region I Mr. P. W. Finney, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. R. R. Janati, DEP/BRP Ms. C. J. Sanders, NRC Project Manager Document Control Desk PLA-6877
NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER)
- 1. FACILITY NAME (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1
- 4. TITLE
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000387
- 3. PAGE 1 OF 3 Unit 1 Secondary Containment TS 3.6.4.2 Combined LCO Time Exceeded on Two Occasions when the Primary Containment N2 Spectacle Flange was Rotated in the Open Position
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
01 28 2011 2012 - 004 -
00 06 26 2012 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201 (b)
D 20.2201 (d)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i) t-1-0-. P_O_W_E_R-LE
__ V_E_L----10 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 35 o/o D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50.36(c)(2)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 1:8] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
D 73.71 (a)(4)
D 73.71 (a)(5) 0 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER Facility Name Brenda W. O'Rourke, Senior Engineer-Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
CAUSE
MANU-SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 0 YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
CAUSE
1:8] NO ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
Telephone Number (Include Area Code)
(570) 542-1791 MANU-SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER
- 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE MONTH REPORTABLE TO EPIX DAY YEAR On April 27, 2012, it was determined that PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL) failed to enter Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves" Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) when the primary containment nitrogen makeup line spectacle flange (1 S21 04) was rotated in the open position in Modes 1, 2 and 3.
This condition was identified as a result of questions raised regarding the need to enter TS LCO 3.6.4.2, in addition to TS LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Systems Primary Containment Isolation Valves," when the Unit 1 and Unit 2 spectacle flanges were rotated to the open position. A review of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room logs for the past three years identified that on two occasions in 2011 (January 28, 2011 and June 25, 2011 ), the Unit 1 spectacle flange was open for greater than the combined completion times forTS 3.6.4.2, Condition C.1 and 0.1 (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, respectively) of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. As a result, these events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
The cause of the event was less than adequate guidance specified in Operations procedures and status control mechanisms for controlling Secondary Containment.
This event had no impact on the health and safety of the public. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 primary containment nitrogen makeup supply line spectacle flanges have been deleted from the Unit 1 and 2 TS Bases Table B3.6.4.2-2, "Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices."
NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
CONDITION PRIOR TO THE EVENT I
REVISION NUMBER 00
- 3. PAGE 20F3 Unit 1 - Mode 1, 35 percent Rated Thermal Power (at the time the event occurred on January 28, 2011)
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On April 27, 2012, it was determined that PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL) failed to enter Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves" Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) when the primary containment nitrogen makeup line spectacle flange (1 S21 04) was rotated in the open position in Modes 1, 2 and 3. This condition was identified as a result of questions raised regarding the need to enter TS LCO 3.6.4.2, in addition toTS LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Systems Primary Containment Isolation Valves," when the Unit 1 and Unit 2 spectacle flanges were rotated to the open position.
A review of Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room logs for the past three years identified that on two occasions in 2011 (January 28, 2011 and June 25, 2011 ), only TS LCO 3.6.1.3 had been entered when the Unit 1 flange was rotated open. No entry into the LCO forTS 3.6.4.2 occurred. Because the amount of time in which the Unit 1 spectacle flange was rotated open could not be exactly determined, the time when the LCO forTS 3.6.1.3 was entered and exited for the spectacle flange was used to conservatively determine the durations.
On two occasions, the Unit 1 spectacle flange was open for greater than the combined completion times for TS 3.6.4.2, Condition C.1 and 0.1 (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, respectively) of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. As a result, these events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
Less than adequate guidance specified in Operations procedures and status control mechanisms for controlling Secondary Containment. The required station procedures, work instruction templates, the SSES Nuclear Information Management System component information "Requirements" field, and work orders for primary containment nitrogen makeup line spectacle flange work activities do not provide sufficient detail to address Secondary Containment status control and Technical Specification compliance.
ANALYSIS I SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE The spectacle flanges (1 S21 04 and 2S21 04) on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 primary containment nitrogen supply lines are not secondary containment isolation devices. SSES FSAR Table 6.2-15, FSAR Section 6.2 and calculation EC-059-1 024, defines the design function of the spectacle flanges as Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage control. As with other piping systems that penetrate secondary containment, the piping forms the boundary protection from inleakage. Whether the blind side or the spectacle side of the flange is installed, the pipe provides protection from inleakage into the secondary containment boundary not the installed flange.
As such, this event had no impact on the health and safety of the public. (10-2010)
- 1. FACILITY NAME U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LEA NUMBER YEAR
- 3. PAGE I
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 05000387 I
REVISION NUMBER 30F3 2012
--004--
00
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Key Completed Actions The spectacle flanges (1 S21 04 and 2S21 04) on the primary containment nitrogen makeup supply lines were deleted from the Unit 1 and 2 TS Bases Table 83.6.4.2-2, "Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices."
Key Planned Corrective Actions Review station procedures that could manipulate the components listed in TS Table B 3.6.4.2-1 and 3.6.4.2-2, to ensure that a precautionary or prerequisite note and procedural steps are added to contact Operations for entry or exiting TS 3.6.4.2. Procedural step shall reflect contacting Operations prior to manipulation of these components.
Label penetrations and valves listed in TS Table 3.6.4.2-2 from TS 3.6.4.2 with the following note:
.. Operation of these components can cause entry in to LCO 3.6.4.2 condition, contact control room for further information."
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
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