05000387/LER-2003-003, Unit 1 Regarding Both Trains of Standby Gas Treatment Inoperable Due to Inadequate Maintenance & Inadequate Operability Testing
| ML032480935 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/2003 |
| From: | Richard Anderson Susquehanna |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PLA-5651 LER 03-003-00 | |
| Download: ML032480935 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3872003003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Richard L Anderson PPL Susquehanna, LLC
\\ a Vice President - Nuclear Operations 769 Salem Boulevard v
Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.§42.3883 Fax 570.642.1504 -
- - - ; _~~~~~~~~iadersobn~pphyeb.com p
l w-AUG 2 1 2003 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Stop OP 1-17 Washington, DC 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-38712003-003-00 LICENSE NO. NPF-14 PLA-5651 Docket No. 50-387 Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-387/2003-003-00. This event was inadvertently submitted as Licensee Event Report 50-387/2003-002-00 in PLA-5629 on June 10, 2003.
Licensee Event Report 50-387/2003-002-00 had been previously submitted in PLA-5612 on April 4, 2003.
The event was determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), an Event or Condition That Alone Could Prevent Fulfillment of a Safety Function, and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), a Condition Prohibited by the Technical Specifications.
The 'B' Standby Gas Treatment train was inadvertently made inoperable from November 19, 2002 until April 16, 2003 due to incorrect control circuit wiring configuration for its inlet damper. The incorrect wiring condition was found during periodic surveillance testing. Additionally, the 'A' train was removed from service several times during that time period. The incorrect wiring condition has been corrected.
This event resulted in no actual adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public. There are no commitments associated with this Licensee Event Report.
Richard L. Anderson Vice President - Nuclear Operations Attachment
4 2-Document Control Desk PLA-5651 cc:
Mr. H. J. Miller Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19408 Mr. S. L. Hansell Sr. Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 35 Berwick, PA 18603-0035 Mr. R. Osborne Allegheny Electric Cooperative P. O. Box 1266 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1266 Mr. R R. Janati Bureau of Radiation Protection Rachel Carson State Office Building P. O. Box 8469 Harrisburg, PA 17105-8469
Abstract
At 22:35 on April 16, 2003 with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 in Mode 4 at 0% power, a Secondary Containment Surveillance Test revealed that the 'B' train of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) inlet damper was inoperable. Electrical Maintenance personnel discovered that the control circuit wires external to the damper actuator had their polarities reversed. Although the polarity reversal had existed since 1998, the damper became inoperable during actuator replacement work performed in November of 2002. Additionally, it was determined that the 'A' train of SGTS was removed from service several times while the 'B' train of SGTS was inoperable. The wiring error was corrected and the 'B' train of SGTS was returned to operable status at 14:15 on April 17, 2003. Three root causes were found. The procedure used to replace the damper actuator was not explicit enough with respect to control circuit wiring configuration. Work Management personnel did not specify the correct operability testing for the actuator replacement on the work order release In 2002 and Operations release and close out of the work order did not detect the omission. A contributing factor to the work order release errors is that station procedures and computerized workflow steps for operability testing process contain inconsistencies. The procedures for actuator maintenance and operability testing will be revised to correct these deficiencies. This event is reportable as a Condition Prohibited by the Technical Specifications per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and as an Event or Condition That Alone Could Prevent Fulfillment of a Safety Function per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) for Unit 1 and Unit 2. There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event since neither of the SGTS trains were required to actuate during the time they were inoperable.
NRC FORM 366 8(71
)
(if more space Is required, use addiional copies of (if mrwe space is required, use addiional cois of (If mor space is required, use addional copies of NRC Fom 366A)The SGTS is designed to accomplish the following safety related objectives:
a)
Exhaust sufficient filtered air from the Reactor Building (EIIS Code: NG) to maintain a negative pressure of about 0.25 inches water gauge in the affected volumes following secondary containment isolation for a spent fuel handling accident in the refueling floor area and for a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
b)
Filter the exhausted air to remove radioactive particulates and both radioactive and non-radioactive forms of iodine to limit the offsite dose to the guidelines of 10 CFR1 00.
There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event since neither train of SGTS were required to actuate during the time they were inoperable. During those periods when both trains of SGTS were inoperable there were no irradiated fuel moves taking place. However, the SGTS would not have been able to fulfill the above objectives during those times if a LOCA would have occurred. During the remaining periods from November 19, 2002 until April 16, 2003 (when only the
'B' train was inoperable), the 'A' train was operable and would have been capable of meeting the above safety related objectives.
In accordance with guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 2, the due date for this report is June 16, 2003.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Corrective actions that have been completed:
- The error in the wiring configuration was corrected and the 'B' SGTS train was returned to operable status.
- It was confirmed that the 'A' SGTS train was not affected by wiring configuration problems via proper system testing.
Corrective actions to be completed:
- Revise the maintenance procedures that remove, rebuild and replace the subject damper actuators to provide sufficient distinction in the terminology used to describe the wires that are internal to the actuator (force coil wires) and those wires that are external to the actuator.
- Revise operability testing process procedures and computerized workflow steps guides to eliminate the inconsistencies.
(ff more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)* Revise RLWO computerized workfiow steps to require an entry for operability testing even if the testing required is "none."
- Provide training to Unit Supervisor personnel on the requirement to evaluate component and system operability testing during RLWO release and close out.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Past Similar Events:
None Failed Component:
'B' SGTS train Inlet Damper PDD07554B Manufacturer.
ITT Model:
NH93