05000341/LER-2018-007, Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

ML19036A741
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	02/04/2019
From:	Polson K DTE Energy
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NRC-19-0007 LER 2018-007-00
Download: ML19036A741 (6)

LER-2018-007, Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
3412018007R00 - NRC Website

text

Keith J. Poison Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer DTE Energy Company 6400 N. Dixie Highway, Newport, MI 48166 Tel: 734.586.6515 Fax: 734.586.1431 Email: keith.polson@dteenergy.com DTE Energy-10 CFR 50.73 February 4, 2019 NRC-19-0007 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Reference:

Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

Subject:

Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2018-007 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), DTE Electric Company (DTE) is submitting LER No. 2018-007, Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications.

No new commitments are being made in this LER.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Scott A. Maglio, Manager - Nuclear Licensing, at (734) 586-5076.

Sincerely, Keith J. Polson Senior Vice President and CNO

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No. 2018-007, Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

USNRC NRC-19-0007 Page 2 cc: NRC Project Manager NRC Resident Office Reactor Projects Chief, Branch 5, Region III Regional Administrator, Region III Michigan Public Service Commission Regulated Energy Division (kindschlamichigan.gov)

Enclosure to NRC-19-0007 Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2018-007 Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03312020 (04-2018)

Estimated

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. Page Fermi 2 05000 341 1

OF 3

4. Title Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

5. Event Date

6. LER Number

7. Report Date

8. Other Facilities Involved Month Day Year Year Nuquential Rv Month Day Year Faclty Name Docket Number Sequntia RevFacility Name Docket Number Mnh Dy Ya Yer Number No.

Mot a

er N/A050 12 08 2018 2018 -

007 00 02 04 2019 Facility Name

9. Operating Mode

11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

El20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

Q 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 1150.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

Q 20.2201(d)

Q 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

Q 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

Q 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 4 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

L 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

[

50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

E 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

[

50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. Power Level E

20.2203(a)(2)(ii) i 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

Q 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) j 73.71(a)(4)

L 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

Q 50.36(c)(2)

Q 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

J 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) j 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

Q 73.77(a)(1) 0 Q

20.2203(a)(2)(v)

Q 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

Q 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Q 73.77(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

/

50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 1 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

Q Other (Specify in Abstract below or in

SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no safety consequences or radiological releases associated with this event. At no time during this event was there a potential for endangering the public health and safety. The condition described does not impact the ability of the check valve vacuum breaker to perform its required function in each vacuum breaker line. In addition, existing station procedures directed operators to manually close the butterfly valve from the Main Control Room following a loss of power to the valve.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The cause was determined to be a legacy design issue in the control circuits of the suppression chamber to secondary containment butterfly valve vacuum breakers.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The butterfly valve vacuum breaker control circuits have been modified so that the valve operation meets the UFSAR requirements to open when power is lost and to automatically close when power is restored.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

No related previous site occurrences were identified related to deficiencies in vacuum breaker design or operation.Page 3

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