05000341/FIN-2015001-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Correct a Nonconforming Condition Adversely Affecting Plant Safety with the Reactor Building Steam Tunnel Floor Drain |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensees failure to correct, as specified in a plant procedure, a nonconforming condition adversely affecting plant safety. On January 24, 2012, the licensee identified the Reactor Building Steam Tunnel floor drain was clogged and failed to correct the condition during the Cycle 15 refueling outage, which concluded on May 5, 2012. The nonconforming condition was not appropriately documented in the licensees corrective maintenance and corrective action processes during the Cycle 15 refueling outage and evaluated. Subsequent boroscope inspection during the following Cycle 16 refueling outage in 2014 revealed a buildup of what appeared to be cement or compacted dust/dirt blocking the line. No violation of regulatory requirements was identified because the floor drain was not a safety-related component. The licensee entered this finding into its corrective action program (CAP) to complete an investigation and implement corrective actions. The finding was of more than minor safety significance because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to promptly correct the nonconforming condition adversely affected a design basis function credited with mitigating the consequences of internal flooding affecting safety-related plant equipment; in this case, water removal from the Reactor Building Steam Tunnel during high and moderate energy line break accident conditions. The finding was a licensee performance deficiency of very low safety significance (Green) because although the floor drain was not functional, the licensee subsequently evaluated the nonconforming condition and concluded adequate water removal capability existed such that safety-related structures, system, or components (SSCs) in the area would remain operable or functional. This finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance and the field presence aspect due to the licensees failure to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors and supplemental personnel, such that nuclear safety was supported (IMC 0310, H.2) |
| Site: | Fermi  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000341/2015001 Section 1R06 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.06 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Kemker J Jandovitz M Kunowski P Smagacz |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Fermi - IR 05000341/2015001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Fermi) @ 2015Q1
Self-Identified List (Fermi)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||