05000341/FIN-2011002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Fully Evaluate the Failure of H2 O2 Sampling Pump Trips During Calibration |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding and associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure follow their Conduct Manual MES-43, Instrument Calibration Specification Sheets (ICSS), as established in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A.10, to ensure proper verification and calibration of the H2 O2 sample pump trip switch had been done during the annual preventative maintenance (PM) calibration. Specifically the engineering organization did not verify the actual setpoint until the inspector requested the calculations, then the licensee determined that the setpoint was out of tolerance. The licensee entered this into their corrective action program (CAP) as CARD 11-23023. The licensee completed the re-calibration of the flow switch. The inspectors determined that the failure to have a proper calibration of the switch was within their ability to foresee and correct, since the licensee failed to perform an evaluation when it was identified that the pump could trip at a flow setpoint in their normal band of operation established in procedures. Therefore the issue was a performance deficiency. This finding impacted the Mitigating System Cornerstone. The inspectors determined this finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the early loss of the H2O2 sampling pump could have lead to a more significant safety concern and it was similar to the more than minor example of IMC 0612 Appendix E, 4.c. The flow switch for the H2 O2 sampling pump was outside of the acceptable range and would trip early causing a loss of the H2O2 monitoring system. This could complicate the verification of mitigating system equipment in a timely manner during plant events. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, Green, using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Table 4a as all Mitigating System Cornerstone answers were no. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action, because Fermi 2 personnel proceeded in the face of uncertainty or unexpected circumstances by continuing with the calibration procedure and equipment use even though the pump tripped repeatedly at a setpoint value which the procedure established as acceptable, without performing an engineering evaluation that either determined the cause or provided conclusive justification for continued operation. |
| Site: | Fermi  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000341/2011002 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Munir S Sheldon R Morris R Jones J Bozga M Jones T Hartman |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Fermi - IR 05000341/2011002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fermi) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Fermi)
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