The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance with anassociated
NCV of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failingto perform proper motor starting studies to demonstrate that motors would successfullystart when connected to the offsite power supply. This finding was entered into thelicensees corrective action program to revise the calculations and perform an EFA todemonstrate operability.The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integritycornerstone attribute of design control and affected the cornerstone objective to providereasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclidereleases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, failing to demonstrate that theapproved design was adequate to ensure safety-related motors have sufficient voltageto start created a reasonable doubt as to the operability of the control complex heatingventilation and air-conditioning system needed to provide a radiological barrier forcontrol room personnel during an accident. The inspectors determined that this findingis of very low safety significance (Green) because the radiological function of the controlcomplex was not affected. The inspectors concluded that the cause of the finding wasrelated to the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Resources, because thelicensee did not provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation toassure nuclear safety. (
IMC 0310, Section 06.01.b.(3)
H.2(c)