05000341/FIN-2010002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | The following violation of very low significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, states, in part, that Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures and shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not follow their approved procedures to place division 1 EECW makeup pump keylock control switch to AUTO before returning division 1 EECW to service. On December 15, 2009, in preparation for returning division 1 EECW to service, the licensee performed Procedure 23.127, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water/EECW System, Section 5.10 and Attachment 4. The licensee also performed Procedure 24.207.08, Division 1 EECW Pump and Valve Operability Test, Section 5.1, and then returned the system to service at 5:01 a.m. EST on December 16, 2009. At 9:14 a.m., the licensee performed a quarterly surveillance test for the system using Procedure 24.207.08, Division 1 EECW Pump and Valve Operability Test, Section 5.2. During performance of the surveillance test, the licensee discovered the P4400M058A, Division 1 EECW makeup pump keylock control switch, was in OFF instead of AUTO as expected. This condition had rendered Division 1 EECW inoperable and resulted in an unplanned entry into a 72-hour shutdown Limiting Condition for Operation. The licensee documented this issue in CARD 09-29635. Immediate corrective actions were to stop the quarterly surveillance test, to place the keylock control switch to AUTO, perform Procedure 23.127, Section 5.10, Standby Mode EECW Division 1, and perform Procedure 23.127, Attachment 4, Division 1 RBCCW/EECW Standby Verification Check List. The licensee determined the cause to be procedure adherence deficiencies. This finding was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. Using the Significance Determination Process in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, dated January 10, 2008, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because the issue did not result in the actual loss of a safety function. Since the issue was of very low significance (Green) and was discovered during a normally scheduled surveillance, the issue is considered licensee identified |
| Site: | Fermi  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000341/2010002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Mitchell R Morris R Jones J Giessner F Tran M Learn |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Fermi - IR 05000341/2010002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fermi) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Fermi)
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