05000338/FIN-2014002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Mark a Foreign Material Exclusion Closure Device Results in Non-Functionality of the Alternate AC Diesel |
| Description | A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to mark a foreign material exclusion (FME) closure device, as required by licensee procedure MA-AA-102, Foreign Material Exclusion, Revision 14. This resulted in the non-functionality of the alternate AC (AAC) diesel. The inspectors reviewed the issue of concern in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to mark the #4 lifter side cover as an FME closure device as required by licensee procedure MA-AA-102 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and the related attribute of equipment performance. Specifically, the resultant improper installation of the #4 lifter side cover caused the nonfunctionality of the AAC diesel. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process For Findings At-Power , issued June 19, 2012, and determined that Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Question was applicable since the AAC diesel is a mitigating system component. The inspectors determined that a Detailed Risk Evaluation was required because the finding represented an actual loss of function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hrs. A detailed risk evaluation of the PD was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst (SRA) using the guidance of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix A, and the latest NRC North Anna SPAR model. The resultant increase in core damage frequency from the PD was <1E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance. In addition, this finding involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance and the aspect of Avoid Complacency, H.12, because the licensee failed to recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes caused by not labeling the FME closure device during the AAC diesel maintenance. |
| Site: | North Anna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000338/2014002 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Toth G Kolcum M Bates M King R Carrion R Clagg |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - North Anna - IR 05000338/2014002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (North Anna) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (North Anna)
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