05000338/FIN-2009002-02
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Accomplish Procedures Renders Both Trains of High Head Safety Injection System Inoperable |
| Description | A Green Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the NRC for multiple examples of a failure to accomplish a procedure for activities affecting quality which rendered both trains of high head safety injection (HHSI) inoperable. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as CR114725.This finding had a credible impact on safety because both trains of the HHSI were rendered inoperable, and manual operator action was required to place at least one train in service. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and the related attribute of human performance which involved the failure to adequately accomplish procedures. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the significance determination process (SDP) and determined that a Phase III evaluation was required. A regional Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation under the SDP. The performance deficiency was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The evaluation was accomplished using the NRCs probabilistic risk assessment computer model of the plant with Emergency Diesel Generator 1J and the Boron Injection Tanks inlet motor operated valve 1867Aset to always fail. The model was quantified, assuming the configuration lasted for nine hours. The dominant accident sequences were Losses of Offsite Power as the initiating event followed by the failure through various mechanisms of the 1Hemergency diesel generator and the Alternate Alternating Current Diesel Generator. Also, neither the failed Emergency Diesel Generators nor offsite power was recovered prior to core damage. The key assumptions were that Unit 2 was constructed similar enough that the Unit 1 probabilistic risk assessment model could be used and the duration of the configuration was nine hours. This finding involved the cross-cutting area of human performance, the component of decision-making and the aspect of safety-significant decisions using a systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained, because the personnel performing quality related activities involving 2-SI-MOV-2867A failed to make adequate decisions affecting nuclear safety while performing procedures (H.1.a) |
| Site: | North Anna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000338/2009002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Michel R Hamilton R Chou J Reece G Mccoy R Clagg R Williams |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - North Anna - IR 05000338/2009002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (North Anna) @ 2009Q1
Self-Identified List (North Anna)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||