05000334/FIN-2014002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Main Transformer Fault due to Static Electrification |
| Description | A self-revealing, Green finding was identified because FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) did not evaluate technical information provided in a vendor report as required by FENOC procedures: 1/2-ADM-2017, Control of Vendor Technical Information and NOP-CC-1003, Vendor Manuals and Vendor Technical Information. Specifically, FENOC did not take action to address the recommendation in the ABB Inc.Life Assessment Report, dated September 2, 2008, to prevent the running of all the main transformer oil pumps when the oil temperature is below 50C. As a result on January 6, 2014 the Beaver Valley main transformer failed resulting in a reactor trip. Following the trip FENOC conducted an apparent cause evaluation and determined the transformer failure resulted from static electrification caused by improper cooling system operation. FENOC subsequently performed corrective actions included a review of engineering training and updating the operating procedures for the main transformer at both units. The inspectors determined the actions to be reasonable. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the main transformer faulted due to improper guidance on transformer cooling bank operation which resulted in a plant trip. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency did not cause both a reactor trip and the loss of mitigating equipment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Design Margin, in that FENOC did not ensure that equipment margin was carefully guarded and changed through a systematic and rigorous process. Specifically, FENOC did not ensure that the vendor technical review process implemented main transformer operating margin guidance that resulted in the failure of the transformer (H.6). |
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000334/2014002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Orr E Burket E Carfang J Nadel K Mangan N Floyd R Rolph S Pindale |
| CCA | H.6, Design Margins |
| INPO aspect | WP.2 |
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Finding - Beaver Valley - IR 05000334/2014002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Beaver Valley) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Beaver Valley)
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