05000334/FIN-2008003-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Deficient Control of Clearance Posting Interrupts Reactor Coolant Charging Path While Vessel Water Level Drained Below the Flange |
| Description | \"A self-revealing finding was identified for failure to properly coordinate clearance activities associated with testing for penetration 2X-46 during reduced reactor coolant system (RCS) level. A decision to post a clearance to support penetration testing resulted in the isolation of the make-up flow charging path to the reactor coolant system, resulting in an unexpected reduction of reactor coolant vessel level that was identified and stabilized within the established band. The licensees immediate corrective actions were to stop work, perform system configuration verification, and re-evaluated in progress and planned activities for plant safety impact. Long-term corrective actions include a change in procedures to not allow this type of penetration test in this plant configuration. The finding is more than minor because it affects the configuration control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affects the shutdown equipment lineup needed for stable reactor vessel level control during reduced RCS level operations, a high risk evolution. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 SDP evaluation in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 3, Pressurized Water Reactor Cold Shutdown and Refueling Operation with RCS Open and Refueling Cavity Level < 23. The inspectors reviewed station drawings and records of reactor vessel level indication during the event. The inspectors determined that although make-up flow was momentarily isolated, reactor vessel level was maintained, sufficient indication existed, and no actual loss of RCS inventory occurred. Therefore, a Phase 2 quantitative assessment was not required and the issue screened to Green (very low safety significance). The cause of this finding is related to the cross-cutting area of human performance, in that FENOC did not appropriately coordinate work activities for the existing plant conditions to ensure the operational impact on reactor vessel level while at a reduced water level was fully understood H.3(b) |
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000334/2008003 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2008 (2008Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Moslak D Werkheiser P Kaufman A Ziedonis D Kern D Spindler R Bellamy |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Beaver Valley - IR 05000334/2008003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Beaver Valley) @ 2008Q2
Self-Identified List (Beaver Valley)
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