05000333/FIN-2016001-04
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Finding | |
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Title | |
Description | The inspectors identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, because unplanned inoperability of the secondary containment system was not reported to the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Specifically, following reasonable resolution of questions regarding the reliability of secondary containment differential pressure (d/p) instrumentation indications, FitzPatrick staff did not promptly report that, during a transfer from normal reactor building ventilation in service to the reactor building being isolated with the SBGTS in service, reactor building d/p briefly dropped below the TS required minimum value of 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge and therefore caused the secondary containment system to be inoperable. As immediate corrective action, the event was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The issue was entered into the CAP as CR-JAF-2015-05244 and CR-JAF-2015-05265. The inspectors determined that the failure to inform the NRC of the secondary containment system inoperability within eight hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. The inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that a safety system functional failure was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe, thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter. Using Example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects. |
Site: | FitzPatrick ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000333/2016001 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Burritt B Sienel E Knutson J Schoppy J Schussler |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2016001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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