05000333/FIN-2016001-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Unintended HPCI Pump Suction Transfer during Pressure Control Mode Operation |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to maintain a condition specified in an emergency operating procedure. Specifically, while operating the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system in the pressure control mode, operators failed to override automatic transfer of the HPCI pump suction from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the suppression pool prior to the transfer actually occurring. As a result, operators had to revert to using the safety/relief valves (S/RVs) for pressure control, which introduced additional, unnecessary plant challenges. As immediate corrective action, operators secured HPCI, overrode the automatic HPCI pump suction transfer, realigned the pump suction to the CST, and restarted HPCI in the pressure control mode. The issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2016-00765. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the operators failure to timely override automatic transfer of the HPCI suction to the suppression pool resulted in an additional, avoidable post-scram pressure and level transient being placed on the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and unnecessarily reduced the thermal capacity of the suppression pool. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At- Power, the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification (TS) allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risksignificant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Procedure Adherence, because operators did not follow guidance of EOP-2 for the HPCI pump suction to be aligned to the CST by bypassing the HPCI pump suction swap to the suppression pool in a timely manner, such that the swap actually occurred [H.8]. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2016001 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Burritt B Sienel E Knutson J Schoppy J Schussler |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2016001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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