05000331/LER-2012-005-01, Regarding Secondary Containment Damper Inoperable, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

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Regarding Secondary Containment Damper Inoperable, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
ML13074A036
Person / Time
Site: Duane Arnold NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/14/2013
From: Richard Anderson
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
NG-13-0117 LER 12-005-01
Download: ML13074A036 (4)


LER-2012-005, Regarding Secondary Containment Damper Inoperable, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3312012005R01 - NRC Website

text

March 14,2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket 50-331 Renewed Op. License No. DPR-49 Licensee Event Report #2012-005-01 NEXTera M

ENERGY.

DUANE

~

ARNOLD NG-13-0117 10CFR50.73 Please find attached the subject report submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This letter makes no new commitments or changes to any existing

commitments

T~cf.~ C __

Richard L. Ande7;;;

Vice President, Duane Arnold Energy Center NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, 3277 DAEC Road, Palo, IA 52324

NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Duane Arnold Energy Center
2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000331
3. PAGE 1 OF 3
4. TITLE Secondary Containment Damper Inoperable, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME N/A DOCKET NUMBER 05000 11 24 12 2012 005 1

03 14 13 FACILITY NAME N/A DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 4 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 0%

20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

VOLUNTARY LER

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Robert J. Murrell, Engineering Analyst (319) 851-7900 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On November 24, 2012, with the reactor shutdown for a planned refueling outage, Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 3.6.4.1-01B, which demonstrates the ability of the B Standby Gas Treatment System to maintain secondary containment under calm wind conditions, failed to achieve a 0.25 inches water gauge (wg) vacuum at a normal SBGT flow rate of 3800 cubic feet per minute (cfm). Subsequent investigations revealed that secondary containment isolation damper 1VAD017B1 was partially open. Further troubleshooting confirmed that maintenance performed on June 21, 2012 caused the damper to remain partially open. In order to comply with the Technical Specification (TS)

Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO), 1VAD017A1 was de-energized in the closed position. With the affected flow path isolated, the B SBGT train was able to achieve the required 0.25 in. wg vacuum. Since 1VAD017B1 was inoperable from June 21, 2012 to November 24, 2012, it violated its TS LCO action statement 3.6.4.2.A.1 which requires an inoperable flow path be isolated within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of inoperability. Therefore, this event resulted in a condition prohibited by TS. The root cause of this event is inadequate work order guidance.

The safety significance of this event was minimized by the fact that the A damper in the flow path containing 1VAD017B1 was fully operable during the time in question and testing results show that SBGT was capable of achieving 0.25 in. wg vacuum with 1VAD017A1 closed.

(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER IV.

Corrective Actions

On November 24, 2012, the affected flow path was isolated when the inoperable damper was de-energized in the closed position.

Investigation and repair of the damper was completed and 1VAD017B1 was returned to operable condition on January 13, 2013.

Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:

The secondary containment isolation damper maintenance procedure, GMP-MECH-42 has been revised to provide guidance for rotation adjustments on each individual damper when rebuilding or adjusting secondary containment dampers.

Corrective Actions for Extent of Condition:

The stop rod positions for similar secondary containment dampers will be verified. This is limited to 1VAD15A, 1VAD15B, 1VAD19B, 1VAD51A, 1VAD51B, and 1VAD52B.

V.

Additional Information

Previous Similar Occurrences:

A review of License Event Reports from the past 5 years identified one similar occurrence of secondary containment being affected by an inoperable damper. This event is documented in LER 2012-003, Secondary Containment Damper Failures.

EIIS System and Component Codes:

NH - Reactor Containment Building.

Reporting Requirements

This event is being reported as an Operation or Condition Prohibited by TS, 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).