05000331/FIN-2012005-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Lack of Procedure Leads to Over Filling Condensate Storage Overflow Tank |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to establish a procedure for filling the condensate storage tanks (CSTs) from multiple sources. Specifically, the lack of procedural instructions or guidance for controlling the CST filling process resulted in over filling the CST overflow tank on October 8, 2012, and subsequent leakage past a missing CST pit penetration seal to the nearby soil. The licensee entered the inspectors concerns into the CAP as CR 01812345. The licensee repaired the penetration seal and revised the applicable Annunciator Response Procedures and Operating Instructions. The inspectors determined that failing to establish a written procedure for filling the CSTs represented a performance deficiency because it was the result of the licensees failure to meet a TS requirement, and the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and a finding because it was associated with the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of programs and processes and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain as a result of civilian nuclear reactor operation. The inspectors applied IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, to this finding. Because the finding and associated programmatic weakness was in the licensees Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone, Table 3 instructed reference of IMC 0609, Appendix D, Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process. Because the finding was related to the effluent release program, did not constitute a substantial failure to implement the effluent program, and did not result in any public dose, the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency was associated with the crosscutting aspect of Human Performance, having Work Control components, and involving the licensee appropriately planning the work activity by incorporating the need for planned contingencies, compensatory actions, and abort criteria. |
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000331/2012005 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Pr Safety |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Orlikowski M Phalen D Jones L Haeg J Draper R Murray S Bell R Elliott |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Duane Arnold - IR 05000331/2012005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Duane Arnold) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Duane Arnold)
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