05000331/FIN-2009002-02
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed when the operators exceeded the operational limit of the cooling tower riser by failing to secure one of the two running circulating water pumps prior to securing flow to the A cooling tower. The inspectors determined that the operators exceeding the operational limit of the B cooling tower west riser was contrary to the guidance for safe operation of plant equipment contained in Administrative Control Procedure (ACP) 110.1, Conduct of Operations, and therefore was a performance deficiency. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as CAP 063426. The B cooling tower riser was repaired, structural support was added to all four cooling tower risers, and operating procedures were revised to preclude operators from operating two circulating water pumps with only one cooling tower in operation. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Reactor Safety Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown. Specifically, operating the plant in an inappropriate configuration resulted in the loss of the normal plant heat sink, which required the operators to manually scram the reactor and rely on safety-related equipment to cool the plant down. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only resulted in a reactor scram and did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action, because the licensee did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner. Specifically, maintenance and operations personnel failed to adequately address a known deficiency with a plugged pressure transmitter, which resulted in the control room allowing throttling of the A cooling tower riser valves until they were fully shut, thus exceeding the operational limit of the cooling tower P.1(d) |
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000331/2009002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Holmberg K Riemer R Orlikowski R Baker J Neurauter T Go A Scarbeary |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
| ' | |
Finding - Duane Arnold - IR 05000331/2009002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Duane Arnold) @ 2009Q1
Self-Identified List (Duane Arnold)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||