05000324/LER-2006-005, Regarding Control Room Emergency Ventilation (Crev) System Inoperable Due to Chlorine Detectors

Regarding Control Room Emergency Ventilation (Crev) System Inoperable Due to Chlorine Detectors

ML062850092
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	10/03/2006
From:	Waldrep B Progress Energy Carolinas, Progress Energy Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
BSEP 06-0108 LER 06-005-00
Download: ML062850092 (6)

LER-2006-005, Regarding Control Room Emergency Ventilation (Crev) System Inoperable Due to Chlorine Detectors

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3242006005R00 - NRC Website

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). rogress Energy October 3,2006 SERIAL: BSEP 06-0108 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Subject :

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324License Nos. DPR-7 1 and DPR-62 Licensee Event Report 1-2006-005 Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73, Carolina Power

& Light Company, now doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Randy C. Ivey, Manager - Support Services, at (910) 457-2447.

Sincerely, B. C. Waldrep Plant General Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant MAT/mat

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report Progress Energy Carolinas. Inc.

Brunswick Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 10429 Southport. NC 28461

Document Control Desk BSEP 06-0108 / Page 2 cc (with enclosure):

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Dr. William D. Travers, Regional Administrator Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303-8931 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Eugene M. DiPaolo, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Brenda L. Mozafari (Mail Stop OWFN 8G9) (Electronic Copy Only) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Ms. Jo A. Sanford Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-051

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-2004)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2007

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to the information collection.

3. PAGE Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit 1 05000325 1 of 5

4. TITLE Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System Inoperable due to Chlorine Detectors

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO MONTH DAY YEAR Brunswick Unit 2 05000324 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 06 2006 2006 -- 005 --

00 10 03 2006 05000

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 1 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) the CREV system to be restored to operable status. The chlorine tank car will not be brought within the exclusion area unless the chlorine protection mode of CREV is restored to operable status.

• Specification 252-100, "Chlorine Gas Monitors," will be revised to ensure that design of the chlorine detection subsystem includes consideration of the potential for inadvertent actuation of the detectors due to cross-contamination. This revision is scheduled to be completed by December 13, 2006.

Previous Similar Events

A review of LERs and corrective action program condition reports for the past three years identified the following similar events.

• LER 1-2006-003, dated June 7, 2006, documents a condition where the CREV system was declared inoperable due to a design deficiency introduced as a result of the February 3, 2006, modification to replace obsolete detectors in the chlorine detection system. The root cause of the event reported in LER 1-2006-003 was ineffective design review of the chlorine detector modification prior to approval. The corrective actions associated with LER 1-2006-003 could not have reasonably been expected to prevent the condition reported in this LER.

• LER 1-2006-001, dated March 9, 2006, documents a condition where the CREV system was declared inoperable when the 2B Control Building instrument air compressor failed and the CREV system shutdown due to loss of control air. The root cause of this event was determined to be ineffective condition monitoring of compressor oil pressure to detect degradation of the compressor.

The corrective actions associated with LER 1-2006-001 could not have reasonably been expected to prevent the condition reported in this LER.

• LER 1-2005-004, dated July 11, 2005, documents a condition where the CREV and Control Room AC systems were declared inoperable when electrical power was lost to bus E1, making the 2B Compressor inoperable. The 2A Compressor should have automatically started, but did not start due to a wire lug that had broken and interrupted the control power circuit. The corrective actions associated with LER 1-2005-004 could not have reasonably been expected to prevent the condition reported in this LER.

Commitments

No regulatory commitments are contained in this report.