LER-2006-003, Re Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Trip from Neutron Monitoring System |
| Event date: |
|
|---|
| Report date: |
|
|---|
| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
|---|
| 3242006003R00 - NRC Website |
|
text
Progress Energy SERIAL: BSEP 07-0024 10 CFR 50.73 FEB 2 3 2007 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-324/License No. DPR-62 Licensee Event Report 2-2006-003 Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73, Carolina Power
& Light Company, now doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within sixty (60) days of a reportable occurrence.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Randy C. Ivey, Manager -
Support Services, at (910) 457-2447.
Sincerely, B. C. Waldrep Plant General Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant LJG/ljg
Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Brunswick Nuclear Plant PO Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461
Document Control Desk BSEP 07-0024 / Page 2 cc (with enclosure):
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Dr. William D. Travers, Regional Administrator Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303-8931 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Eugene M. DiPaolo, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Stewart N. Bailey (Mail Stop OWFN 8B 1) (Electronic Copy Only) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Ms. Jo A. Sanford Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-051
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/3012007 (6-2004)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to the information ccdlection.
- 3. PAGE Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit 2 05000324 1 OF 6
- 4. TITLE Automatic Reactor Scram due to Trip from Neutron Monitoring System
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED M FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONT DAY YEA YEA SEUMENTA REV MONTH DAY YEAR 12 25 2006 2006 --
003 00 02 23 2007 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 0l 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
C_ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[-
50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL [I 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
ED 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x) 64 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71 (a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
E] 73.71(a)(5)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
E]
OTHER specify in Abstract below El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The safety significance of this condition is considered minimal. The RPS initiated the reactor scram as designed, vessel water level was promptly restored, and all appropriate safety system actuations functioned as expected. Operations personnel responded appropriately in accordance with procedures and ensured plant safety was not jeopardized. No actual THI condition existed and fuel thermal limits were not challenged.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The following are corrective actions to prevent recurrence:
" Interim operating guidance which restricts operation in SLO was implemented.
" Additional procedurally specified operating margin and enhanced monitoring requirements to limit the risk of a scram when in SLO will be provided.
" The Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) Power/Flow maps will be revised to provide conservatism to the MIELLLA line when operating in OPRM enabled region during SLO.
" A formal process will be developed to evaluate correspondence from sources outside of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) OE, such as BWROG organizations, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and vendor information, to be captured in the BSEP procedures and processes.
The following are additional corrective actions:
" An Engineering Change to raise the Confirmation Density Algorithm (CDA) to prevent unnecessary alarms/trips from causing nuisance alarms on the Process Computer Event Alarm Log was implemented.
" OPRM trip settings will be evaluated to minimize spurious scrams and alarms.
" Operator training will be enhanced on THI, APRM noise, and the OPRM system upon evaluation of this event.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A review of LERs and corrective action program condition reports which have occurred within the past three years has not identified any previous similar occurrences.
COMMITMENTS
No regulatory commitments are contained in this report.
|
|---|
|
|
| | | Reporting criterion |
|---|
| 05000324/LER-2006-001, From Brunswick, Unit 2 Regarding Loss of Startup Auxiliary Transformer Results in Unit 2 Manual Reactor Protection System Actuation | From Brunswick, Unit 2 Regarding Loss of Startup Auxiliary Transformer Results in Unit 2 Manual Reactor Protection System Actuation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000324/LER-2006-002, Regarding Manual Scram Due to Conductivity Increase | Regarding Manual Scram Due to Conductivity Increase | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000325/LER-2006-002, Regarding Cracking Found in B Loop Spray Header Piping | Regarding Cracking Found in B Loop Spray Header Piping | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000325/LER-2006-003 | Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System Inoperable due to Chlorine Detection Modification Deficiency | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | | 05000324/LER-2006-003, Re Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Trip from Neutron Monitoring System | Re Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Trip from Neutron Monitoring System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000325/LER-2006-004, Regarding As-Found Values for Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoints Outside Technical Specification Allowed Tolerance | Regarding As-Found Values for Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoints Outside Technical Specification Allowed Tolerance | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000324/LER-2006-005, Regarding Control Room Emergency Ventilation (Crev) System Inoperable Due to Chlorine Detectors | Regarding Control Room Emergency Ventilation (Crev) System Inoperable Due to Chlorine Detectors | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000324/LER-2006-006-01, Technical Specifications for Reactor Recirculation Pump Speed Match Criteria Is Non-Conservative | Technical Specifications for Reactor Recirculation Pump Speed Match Criteria Is Non-Conservative | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000324/LER-2006-007-01, Regarding Operations Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator 1 | Regarding Operations Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator 1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000324/LER-2006-007, Regarding Operations Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator 1 | Regarding Operations Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator 1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
|
