05000324/FIN-2011004-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Configuration Control Resulted in Rainwater Intrusion into the Unit 2 Reactor Building |
Description | A self-revealing Green non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for failure to implement procedural requirements of the equipment configuration control program to ensure that temporary power cables routed through an open manhole and into the reactor building north RHR (NRHR) room did not adversely impact the flood mitigation function of the storm drain system. This finding resulted in rainwater intrusion into the unit 2 reactor building. Upon discovery of this condition, the licensee resealed the manhole. The condition was entered into the licensees CAP as AR #483473. The failure to implement the requirements of the equipment configuration control program to ensure that the temporary cable routing did not adversely impact external flood protection features was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors - Flood Hazards and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the temporary change impacted the storm drain system which was credited for external flood protection. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) was not a design or qualification deficiency that was confirmed not to affect equipment operability; (2) did not represent a loss of safety function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of a single train of equipment for more than its Technical Specification allowed outage time; (4) did not represent a loss of risk significant non-Technical Specification equipment; and (5) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event per table 4b of the worksheet because the leakage did not degrade the RHR system. The cause of the finding was directly related to the appropriately planning work activities cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area because the licensee failed to incorporate environmental conditions which may impact plant structures, systems, and components into the temporary change. |
Site: | Brunswick |
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Report | IR 05000324/2011004 Section 1R06 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.06 |
Inspectors (proximate) | M Riley T Ross A Nielsen S Walker T Morrissey R Musser A Rogers G Kolcum P Lessard J Eargle L Pressley M Schwieg |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2011004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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