05000324/FIN-2010008-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Perform Appropriate Corrective Actions for Deficiencies with Opening a Service Water Valve |
| Description | The team identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, for the licensees failure to maintain adequate abnormal operating procedures (AOP) for opening a service water cross-tie valve during a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event. The valve would not open against system differential pressure (dp) and the licensees corrective actions did not address the valves manipulation in AOPs. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as NCR 428809. After discovering the difficulty of opening the service water cross-tie valves against a maximum differential pressure, the licensees failure to provide appropriate procedural guidance to assure the operation of the valves during a LOOP event was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more that minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences because the SW-V146 valve would not open against a system pressure of 75 psid; and, if this condition was left uncorrected, the ability to complete required operator actions in procedures 0AOP18.0 and 0AOP36.1 during a LOOP would be adversely affected. Using Manual Chapter Attachment 0609.04, \"Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings,\" the inspectors determined the finding required a Phase 2 analysis because the finding represented an actual loss of safety function of non-Technical Specification equipment designated as risk significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The Phase 2 analysis determined that this finding was potentially greater than green; therefore, a Phase 3 analysis was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst (SRA). The SRA determined the combined risk associated with the valves function to provide alternate flow to safety-related heat exchangers was very low. In addition, there was a good chance of operator recovery due to the long time period that was available before manipulation of the valve was required. These factors resulted in a risk value corresponding to a Green finding. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of thoroughness of evaluation within the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area P.1(c). |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000324/2010008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: |
| cornerstone | Miscellaneous |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Nicely B Desai T Lighty A Alen D Mas D Jones G Ottenberg |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2010008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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