05000321/FIN-2010009-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Protection of Systems Structures and Components from Damage as a Result of Fire Suppression Activities |
| Description | The team identified a URI concerning protection of equipment in the CSR and adjacent to the CSR from damage from fire suppression activities. During the onsite inspection, the licensee did not present sufficient documentation to demonstrate that a failure, mal-operation, or actuation of the automatic pre-action sprinkler systems or manual fire fighting activities would not significantly impair structures, systems and components considered important to safety. This item is unresolved pending receipt and review of additional documentation. The licensee originally documented its evaluation of compliance to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 in the Evaluation of the Hatch Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program. The NRC approved the Hatch FPP in an SER dated October 4, 1978, based on this evaluation. As part of the above referenced SER, the licensee committed to install sprinklers and additional smoke detection in the CSR during the next plant refueling outage. The licensee subsequently installed two separate 6-inch pre-action sprinkler systems connected to an 8-inch line tied back to the turbine and control building fire loop. This loop is fed by three large fire pumps taking suction from redundant 300,000 gallon water supply tanks. Each of the pre-action sprinkler systems feeds a series of branch lines within the CSR. These branch lines are normally dry. Alarm check and isolation valves, and associated 8-inch and 6-inch water supply piping, are located in FAs outside the CSR. The SER referenced above also incorporated an operating license condition requiring the licensee to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the approved fire protection plan. The HNP FHA Appendix D, BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Compliance,Section IV.B.1.i states, Floor drains are provided throughout the plant to remove water from normal sources. Fires are not normal events and water from some deluge or sprinkler system and from hose streams might temporarily exceed the capacity of the drain system in some areas. However, analyses have shown that these the occurrences would not jeopardize any safety-related systems. Section 3.0 of the HNP FHA, entitled Methodology Subsection 3.7, Flooding/Inadvertent Actuation states, The fire hazard analysis does not specifically address the effects of flooding or water spray due to the rupture or inadvertent actuation of fire suppression systems. Rupture of moderate energy systems is described in Chapter 3 of the FSAR. These two statements in the FHA appear to be inconsistent. Furthermore, the team reviewed HNP Unit 1 and HNP Unit 2 UFSARs and found that neither contained an analysis or calculation demonstrating that rupture of fire suppression systems would not jeopardize safety related systems. Specifically, in the Unit 1 UFSAR, HNP-1-FSAR-15, Table 15A-1, Moderate and High Energy Lines, states systems with service pressure less than 275 psig and temperature less than 200 oF are excluded. Since suppression systems are less than 275 psig and 200 oF, they were excluded for Unit 1. Additionally, the team found that in the Unit 2 UFSAR, HNP-2-FSAR-15A.A.4, Additional Moderate-Energy Lines Needed to be Analyzed, specifically lists the fire protection system. However, the licensee could not locate the analysis for Unit 2. The rupture of fire suppression systems and valves was the subject of Information Notice IN 98-31, Fire Protection System Design Deficiencies and Common Mode Flooding of Emergency Core Cooling System Rooms at Washington Nuclear Project Unit 2. The licensee did not provide documentation that they had addressed this information notice in their operating experience program. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 2010115119. After the on-site inspection, the licensee developed a document based on engineering judgment and transmitted it to the team. This document provides an analysis of installed drain capacity in the CSR and an estimate of expected flow from the pre-action sprinkler system in the event of a fire. Additional review by the NRC will be performed when the remaining documentation and/or analyses have been provided by the licensee that demonstrates that failure, maloperation, or actuation of the automatic pre-action sprinkler systems, or manual fire fighting activities, would not impair structures, systems, and components important to safety in the CSR and adjacent to the CSR. An unresolved item, URI 05000321;05000366/2010009-02, Protection of Systems Structures and Components from Damage as a Result of Fire Suppression Activities, is being opened pending receipt and review of this documentation. This URI applies to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. |
| Site: | Hatch  |
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| Report | IR 05000321/2010009 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | F Ehrhardt M Thomas P Fillion G Wiseman R Nease P Braxton J Dymek |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2010009 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hatch) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Hatch)
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