08-02-2006 | On April 10, 2006, 2-SI-189, ECCS Safety Valves Discharge Header To Pressurizer Relief Tank Containment Isolation Check Valve, had a required surveillance internal inspection performed on it that potentially affected the valve's leak tightness prior to performing the required as-found B&C type leak rate test. This resulted in being unable to meet the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.1 to perform the ,as-found B&C type leak rate test.
The cause of performing the required surveillance internal inspection prior to a required as-found leak rate test was a weakened barrier in that the work activity instructions did not require verification of completion of the as-found leak rate test prior to beginning the internal inspection.
Corrective Actions taken were performance of an acceptable as-left leak rate test following the internal inspection, and revising the valve's surveillance internal inspection work activity to verify completion of the as-found test prior to performing valve disassembly. Corrective Actions to be taken include revising all0
- recurring work activities for Appendix J components that potentially affect a valve's leak tightness to require a verification of completion of the as-found B&C type leak rate test prior to performing an activity.
This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), due to being unable to meet SR 3.6.1.1. |
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LER-2006-005, Failure to Comply with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.1Docket Number |
Event date: |
04-10-2006 |
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Report date: |
08-02-2006 |
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Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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3162006005R00 - NRC Website |
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Conditions Prior to Event Unit 2 was in refueling outage U2C16, in Mode 6.
Description of Event
On April 10, 2006, 2-SI-189, ECCS Safety Valves Discharge Header To Pressurizer Relief Tank Containment Isolation Check Valve [ISV], had a required surveillance inspection performed on it that potentially affected the valve's leak tightness prior to performing the required as-found leak rate test.
This resulted in being unable to meet the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.1 for Containment. SR 3.6.1.1 requires that leakage rate testing be performed in accordance
the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant's Containment -' Leakage Rate Testing Program specifies as-found testing prior to performing maintenance, repairs, or inspections that could reduce containment leakage integrity.
Valve 2-SI-189, ECCS Safety Valves Discharge Header To Pressurizer Relief Tank Containment Isblation Check Valve, was disassembled per Job Order Activity (JOA) R0267698-04 and an internal visual inspection performed per JOA R0267698-03 prior to performance of the required as-found type B&C leak rate test. The scheduling for these activities was correct and the appropriate logic ties were in the schedule.
This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), due to being unable to meet SR 3.6.1.1. This event occurred, and was identified, on April 10, 2006. The non-compliance with the Appendix J program requirements was identified on April 12, 2006. The initial review for applicability to 10 CFR 50.73 reporting requirements determined that the event was not required to be reported.
Subsequent review and discussion between the plant staff and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission determined, after the 60-day time frame had expired, that the event was required to be reported.
Therefore, this Licensee Event Report (LER) is being submitted greater than 60 days after the event.
Cause of Event
The cause of performing the required surveillance internal inspection prior to a required as-found leak rate test was a weakened barrier in that the work activity instructions did not require verification of completion of the as-found leak rate test prior to beginning the internal inspection.
Analysis of Event
The valve disassembly activities performed on 2-SI-189 on April 10, 2006, were for a required surveillance internal inspection. There were no outstanding corrective maintenance activities for 2-SI 189 nor was the valve leakage integrity suspect. Additionally, 2-SI-189 is not on an extended surveillance frequency under the Appendix J program as other more restrictive surveillance requirements outside of the Appendix J program require this valve to be disassembled and inspected on a refueling outage frequency.
Prior to the valve disassembly activities performed on 2-SI-189 on April 10, 2006, the as-left B&C test performed during the previous Unit 2 refueling outage (October 19, 2004) was satisfactory. No maintenance was performed on 2-SI-189 between the satisfactory test on October 19, 2004 and April 10, 2006. Additionally, no flow is expected past this valve during the operating cycle and a review of station Condition Reports between October 2004 and April 2006 did not identify any instances where there was flow past this valve. Thus, it can be concluded that the valve remained in the closed seated position from the satisfactory October 2004 as-left B&C test throughout the last operating cycle.
2-SI-189 is a containment isolation check valve that provides a one-way flow path from Residual Heat Removal [BP] safety valve 2-SV-104W [RV) to the Pressurizer Relief Tank [TK]. Failure of this valve does not contribute to core damage frequency, and additional component failures would be required for the failure to contribute to large early release frequency, which would still be well below 1.0 E-8.
. Therefore, this event was not risk significant.
Corrective Actions
Corrective Actions taken were performance of an acceptable as-left leak rate test following internal inspection of 2-SI-189, and revising the surveillance internal inspection work activity for 2-SI-189 to verify completion of the as-found test prior to performing valve disassembly.
Corrective Actions to be taken include revising all recurring work activities for Appendix J components that potentially affect a valve's leak tightness to require a verification of completion of the as-found B&C type leak rate test prior to performing an activity.
Previous Similar Events
A review was conducted of station Condition Reports and LERs for the previous 3 years. No similar events were identified.
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05000305/LER-2006-010 | | | 05000456/LER-2006-001 | Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Due To Inter-Granular Stress Corrosion Cracking of a Pressurizer Heater Sleeve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000454/LER-2006-001 | Technical Specification Required Action Completion Time Exceeded for Inoperable Containment Isolation Valves Due to Untimely Operability Determination | | 05000423/LER-2006-001 | Loss Of Safety Function Of The Control Room Emergency Ventilation System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000369/LER-2006-001 | Ice Condenser and Floor Cooling System Containment Isolation Valve inoperable longer than allowed by Technical Specification 3.6.3. | | 05000353/LER-2006-001 | HPCI Ramp Generator Signal Converter Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000352/LER-2006-001 | Loss Of One Offsite Circuit Due To Invalid Actuation Of Fire Suppression System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000336/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | 05000316/LER-2006-001 | Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.6.2, Containment Air Locks | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000315/LER-2006-001 | Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specification Action 3.6.5.B.1 | | 05000293/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000289/LER-2006-001 | | | 05000287/LER-2006-001 | Actuation of Emergency Generator due to Spurious Transformer Lockout | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000251/LER-2006-001 | Turkey Point Unit 4 05000251 1 OF 6 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000247/LER-2006-001 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Multiple Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control Rod Power Due to Personnel Error | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000440/LER-2006-001 | Incorrect Wiring in the Remote Shutdown Panel Results in a Fire Protection Program Violation | | 05000413/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000368/LER-2006-001 | Completion of a Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications Due to Loss of Motive Power to Certain Containment Isolation Valves as a Result of a Phase to Ground Short Circuit in a Motor Control Cubicle | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000306/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000298/LER-2006-001 | Cooper Nuclear Station 05000298 1 of 4 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000286/LER-2006-001 | I | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000282/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000266/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000261/LER-2006-001 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Failure of a Turbine Governor Valve Electro-Hydraulic Control Card | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000255/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000461/LER-2006-002 | Turbine Bypass Function Lost Due to Circuit Card Maintenance Frequency | | 05000458/LER-2006-002 | Loss of Safety Function of High Pressure Core Spray Due to Manual Deactivation | | 05000456/LER-2006-002 | Units 1 and 2 Entry into Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 due to Main Control Room Ventilation Envelope Low Pressure | | 05000443/LER-2006-002 | Noncompliance with the Requirements of Technical Specification 6.8.1.2.a | | 05000387/LER-2006-002 | DMissed Technical Specification surveillance requirement | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000362/LER-2006-002 | Unit 3 Shutdown to Inspect Safety Injection Tank Spiral Wound Gaskets | | 05000336/LER-2006-002 | Manual Reactor Trip Due To Trip Of Both Feed Pumps Following A Loss Of Instrument Air | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000316/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000315/LER-2006-002 | Failure to Comply with Technical Specification Requirement 3.6.13, Divider Barrier Integrity | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000293/LER-2006-002 | | | 05000289/LER-2006-002 | | | 05000251/LER-2006-002 | Intermediate Range High Flux Trip Setpoint Exceeded Technical Specification Allowable Value | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000440/LER-2006-002 | Scaffold Built in the Containment Pool Swell Region | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000413/LER-2006-002 | Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged by an External Flooding Event and Inadequate Design and Configuration Control | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000388/LER-2006-002 | Missed Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 Entry for Unit 2 During Unit 1 ESS Bus Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000348/LER-2006-002 | Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Close | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000305/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000301/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000286/LER-2006-002 | 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, N.Y. 10511-0249Entergy Tel (914) 734-6700 Fred Dacimo Site Vice President Administration September 13, 2006 Indian Point Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-286 N L-06-084 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-P1-17 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Subject:L Licensee Event Report # 2006-002-00, "Manual Reactor Trip as a Result of Arcing Under the Main Generator Between Scaffolding and Phase A&B of the Isophase Bus Housing" Dear Sir: The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2006-002-00 is the follow-up written report submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This event is of the type defined in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an event recorded in the Entergy corrective action process as Condition Report CR-IP3-2006-02255. There are no commitments contained in this letter. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Patric W. Conroy, Manager, Licensing, Indian Point Energy Center at (914) 734-6668. Fred R. Dacimo Site Vice President Indian Point Energy Center Docket No. 50-286 NL-06-084 Page 2 of 2 Attachment: LER-2006-002-00 CC: Mr. Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator — Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office Resident Inspector Indian Point Unit 3 Mr. Paul Eddy State of New York Public Service Commission INPO Record Center NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007
(6-2004)
. Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours.DReported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internetLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. ■ 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER I 3. PAGE
INDIAN POINT 3 05000-286 1 OF 6
4.TITLE: Manual Reactor Trip as a Result of Arcing Under the Main Generator Between
Scaffolding and Phase A&B of the Iso-phase Bus Housing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000282/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000269/LER-2006-002 | High Energy Line Breaks Outside Licensing Basis May Result in Loss of Safety Function | | 05000263/LER-2006-002 | | | 05000255/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000254/LER-2006-002 | Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000254 1 of 3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000483/LER-2006-003 | Unexpected Inoperability of the Emergency Exhaust System due to Inoperable Pressure Boundary | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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