05000315/FIN-2012003-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | In June of 2011 during a review of inquiries and replies in the ISI Program Owners Group electronic forum, the licensee was prompted to review whether the Reactor Vessel Supports were included in the ISI program. A review of Cook Nuclear Plant ISI Program Plans from initial plant operation to the current date for both units revealed that the reactor vessel supports had not been included in the ISI Program Plans; therefore ASME code examinations of these supports were not scheduled or performed during the previous ISI intervals. Title 10 CFR 50.55a g(4) states: throughout the service life of a pressurizer water cooled nuclear power facility, components (including supports) which are classified ASME Code Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3 must meet the requirements set forth in ASME Section XI. ASME Section XI IWF-2510 states in part that supports shall be examined in accordance with Table IWF-2500-1, which requires 100 percent of supports other than piping supports be inspected using the VT-3 examination requirements, each inspection interval. The reactor vessel supports are Class 1, non-piping supports; and therefore required to be 100 percent inspected during each ISI interval. Contrary to the above, as of June 2011 the reactor vessel supports, Class I supports, had not been inspected in accordance with the CFR. Though the licensee was performing visual examinations during every outage, these examinations were not driven by a procedure, nor did they have associated lighting requirements or acceptance criteria as would be required by the ASME code. The licensee has accessed the sand box areas, which contain the reactor vessel supports, various times to perform inspections and other maintenance activities and no degradation was noted during any of these activities. Based on this, the licensee determined there is no reason to think there is non-negligible degradation or damage to these supports and they remain operable. Based on the assessment the supports are operable, this finding is of very low safety significance. This issue was documented in AR 2011-8149 and the licensee is currently scheduled to perform the reactor vessel support inspections during the next refueling outage for each unit. |
| Site: | Cook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000315/2012003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Lennartz J Ellegood P Laflamme E Santiago |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Cook - IR 05000315/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cook) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Cook)
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