05000315/FIN-2011005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, procedures, and drawings, was identified by the inspectors on September 27, 2011, for the licensees failure to follow procedure while performing a liquid dye penetrant (PT) examination on safety injection system piping weld. Specifically, on Unit 1, the examiner conducting the PT examination did not measure and hence, appropriately record indications that were identified during the PT examination. Licensee corrective actions included: re-performing the PT examination on the safety injection piping weld, re-performing the examiners prior PT examinations conducted during the current outage to validate the PT examination results, and re-train the examiner. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as AR 2011-11130. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, would become a more significant safety concern. Absent NRC identification, the failure to follow the PT examination procedure would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, failure to measure and hence, appropriately record all reportable indications leaves the potential to accept components with unacceptable cracks to be returned to service. Cracks in components returned to service would place safety-related piping systems at increased risk for through-wall leakage and/or failure. The licensee promptly corrected this issue and no components with unacceptable flaws were returned to service. The inspectors answered No to the SDP Phase I screening question for operating reactors in the Initiating Events Cornerstone, Assuming worst case degradation, would the finding result in exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) limit for any reactor coolant system leakage or could the finding have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function assuming the worst case degradation ? Therefore, this finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee contracted vendor did not follow the established PT examination procedure, and the licensee did not ensure appropriate supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety was supported. |
| Site: | Cook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000315/2011005 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Lennartz T Go P Laflamme A Shaikh E Sanchez S Shah E Davidson |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Cook - IR 05000315/2011005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cook) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Cook)
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