LER-2009-002, For Arkansas Nuclear One, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip from Power in Response to a Fire at the Main Generator Hydrogen Addition Station Caused by a Personnel Error |
| Event date: |
|
|---|
| Report date: |
|
|---|
| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
|---|
| 3132009002R00 - NRC Website |
|
text
1CAN040901 April 1, 2009 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 50-313/2009-002-00 Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 Docket Nos. 50-313 License Nos. DPR-51
Dear Sir or Madam:
In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), enclosed is the subject report concerning a manual reactor trip from power.
New commitments contained in this submittal are documented in the attachment.
Sincerely, DBB/rs Attachment Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333 Russellville, AR 72802 Tel 479-858-4710 David B. Bice Acting Manager, Licensing Arkansas Nuclear One
1CAN040901 Page 2 cc:
Mr. Elmo Collins Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-4125 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Arkansas Nuclear One P.O. Box 310 London, AR 72847 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 LEREvents@inpo.org
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-2007)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/2010
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Arkansas Nuclear One 05000313 1
OF 4
- 4. TITLE Manual Reactor Trip From Power in Response to a Fire at the Main Generator Hydrogen Addition Station Caused by a Personnel Error
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 2
7 2009 2009 002 00 4
01 2009 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 1 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 90 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
OTHER-Specify in Abstract below or in C. Root Cause The root cause of this event was determined to be personnel error. The IAO mistakenly assumed that H2-109 was stuck on its closed seat and proceeded to attempt to open the valve using aTorque Amplifying Device (TAD) without first requesting prior supervisor approval to use such a device, as required by procedure. In addition, the IAO did not apply acquired skills and abilities to the task.
D. Corrective Actions
Immediate corrective actions taken with respect to this event included:
The IAO was removed from shift.
Stand Down meetings were conducted with Operations Department personnel regarding this event.
In addition, remediation training and requalification will be provided for the IAO involved with this event.
E. Safety Significance
Operations personnel responded quickly and appropriately to the hydrogen fire by expeditiously isolating the hydrogen supply and extinguishing the fire. In addition, a conservative decision to manually trip the reactor was made. All systems performed as designed during and after the plant trip. Main steam safety valves lifted as expected following the plant trip from 90 percent power and subsequently reseated, as designed.
Considering the expeditious and appropriate actions taken by the operators to minimize the consequences of this event, the actual safety significance is considered to be minimal.
F. Basis for Reportability The NUE and manual reactor trip were reported to the NRC Operations Center at 1118 CST on February 7, 2009. An update notification reporting the termination of the NUE was made at 1238 CST on February 7, 2009.
A manual reactor trip from power is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
G. Additional Information
There have been no previous similar events in which a fire resulted in a reactor trip reported as LERs at ANO.
Attachment 1CAN040901 List of Regulatory Commitments
Attachment to 1CAN040901 Page 1 of 1 List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by Entergy in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.
COMMITMENT
TYPE (Check One)
SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE (If Required)
ONE TIME ACTION CONTINUING COMPLIANCE Remediation training and requalification will be provided for the IAO involved with this event X
5/5/2009
|
|---|
|
|
| | | Reporting criterion |
|---|
| 05000368/LER-2009-001, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip from Power in Response to Feedwater Regulating Valve Failing Closed | Regarding Manual Reactor Trip from Power in Response to Feedwater Regulating Valve Failing Closed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000313/LER-2009-001, Manual Reactor Trip from Power in Response to a Loss of Control Rod Drive Cooling Water Flow Due to a Gasket Failure Which Resulted in Air Intrusion Into the Intermediate Cooling Water System | Manual Reactor Trip from Power in Response to a Loss of Control Rod Drive Cooling Water Flow Due to a Gasket Failure Which Resulted in Air Intrusion Into the Intermediate Cooling Water System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000313/LER-2009-002, For Arkansas Nuclear One, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip from Power in Response to a Fire at the Main Generator Hydrogen Addition Station Caused by a Personnel Error | For Arkansas Nuclear One, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip from Power in Response to a Fire at the Main Generator Hydrogen Addition Station Caused by a Personnel Error | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000368/LER-2009-002, Containment Building Penetration Isolation Valves Open During Core Alterations W/O Application of Administrative Controls Required by Technical Specifications Due to Inadequate Procedure Instructions | Containment Building Penetration Isolation Valves Open During Core Alterations W/O Application of Administrative Controls Required by Technical Specifications Due to Inadequate Procedure Instructions | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000313/LER-2009-003, Unanalyzed Condition That Significantly Degraded Plant Safety Existed Intermittently Due to an Unlatched Door Serving as a High Energy Line Break Barrier | Unanalyzed Condition That Significantly Degraded Plant Safety Existed Intermittently Due to an Unlatched Door Serving as a High Energy Line Break Barrier | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000368/LER-2009-003, Steam Generator Tube Exceeding Technical Specification Plugging Criteria Remained in Service During Previous Cycles as a Result of the Failure to Use Proper Independent Verification | Steam Generator Tube Exceeding Technical Specification Plugging Criteria Remained in Service During Previous Cycles as a Result of the Failure to Use Proper Independent Verification | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000368/LER-2009-004, Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Actuation While Performing Offsite Power Transfer Testing Due to a High Resistance Contact Supplying Voltage to a Synchronizing Check Relay | Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Actuation While Performing Offsite Power Transfer Testing Due to a High Resistance Contact Supplying Voltage to a Synchronizing Check Relay | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000368/LER-2009-005, Manual Reactor Scram and Emergency Feedwater Automatic Actuation Due to an Unexpected Plant Response Following the Loss of a Main Feedwater Pump at Full Power | Manual Reactor Scram and Emergency Feedwater Automatic Actuation Due to an Unexpected Plant Response Following the Loss of a Main Feedwater Pump at Full Power | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
|