05000311/LER-2004-003, Regarding Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System Unable to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident

Regarding Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System Unable to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident

ML041740713
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/11/2004
From:	Fricker C Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LRN-04-0259 LER 04-003-00
Download: ML041740713 (5)

LER-2004-003, Regarding Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System Unable to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
3112004003R00 - NRC Website

text

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PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 0 PSEG ANuclear LLC JUN 1 2004 LRN-04-0259 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

LER 311104-003-00 SALEM - UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 This Licensee Event Report, "Salem Unit 2 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System Unable to Mitigate The Consequences of an Accident," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

Should there be any questions regarding this matter please contact Rick Villar at 856-339-5456 The attached LER contains no commitments.

Since F cker Salem Plant Manager Attachment

/EHV C

Distribution LER File 3.7 95-2168 REV. 7/99

NRC FCtM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004

- 2001)

COMMISSION the NRC may' not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, the

3. PAGE Salem Unit 2 Generating Station 05000311 1 OF 4

4. TITLE Salem Unit 2 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System Unable to Mitigate The Consequences of an Accident

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTAL REV FArIIl rTV NAM=

fnrmr FT NI IMPR MO DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO MO DAY YEAR qplorm I Init 1 05000272 Farn1 rrV NAMP r

s Mr.

NI IMR:Rz 04 12 2004 2004 -

003 - 00 06 11 2004

9. OPERATING 11 TIlC DARFT IQRI IurrrFn DI I'aI IaNT TATn F:lEAIIARUr;ITnrrfn flD 1r.

na1-ilthnl1*rA MODE I

20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER 100 20.2201(d)

_ 20.2203(a)(4)

_ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

_ 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL 20.2203(a)(1)

_ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

=

50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

_ 73.71 (a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

_ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 173.71 (a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(2)

= 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

Abstract

On April 12, 2004, at approximately 10:33, the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System was placed in a condition where it did not comply with its design basis for post LOCA mitigation. During maintenance of the Salem Unit 1 Solid State Protection System, a safety injection signal was generated.

As a result of the invalid safety injection signal on Unit 1, the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System actuated to its accident pressurized mode alignment, in which the Salem Unit 1 emergency intake air dampers were isolated and the Salem Unit 2 dampers opened. In this configuration, Salem Unit 2 was in a condition where it did not comply with its design basis for post LOCA mitigation. The Salem dose analysis performed to meet the requirements of the General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 states that with only one train of the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System available at the start of a design basis LOCA, the make up air supply to pressurize the control room envelope must be supplied by the non-accident Unit's emergency outside air intake. The apparent cause of this event was a defective universal logic card in the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). When this card was moved from one position to another in the SSPS cabinet, a safety injection signal from Unit 1 Train 'B' occurred. Corrective actions taken were: (1) The defective card was replaced, and (2) A full functional test procedure on Train B was performed satisfactory. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

(If more space Is required, use additonalcopies of (Ifmore space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NJRC Form 366A) (17)

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no safety consequences associated with this event.

Although the CREACS was aligned in a configuration that was non-conforming to the Salem dose analysis assumptions, the time duration of this non-conformance was limited, and no design basis events occurred that required the system to automatically respond.

A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02 did occur.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The defective card was replaced.

2. A full functional test procedure on Train B was performed satisfactory.

3. Maintenance will determine a minimum quantity of refurbished/ tested circuit cards needed to be kept available for troubleshooting and Work Management will create a scheduled operation within the work management process to dedicate the required resources to refurbish and test the needed circuit cards.

4. An operating experience report will be issued relative to this event.

COMMITMENTS

The corrective actions cited in this LER are voluntary enhancements and do not constitute commitments.